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1 Richard D. Cudahy, The Wearing Away of Regulation: What Remains , 124 PUB.
UTIL. FORT., October 12, 1989.  This sentiment extends beyond the realm of energy
markets. See  Marvin S. Cohen, Remarks at Deregulation and Expanding Antitrust
Liability: A New Battleground For Private Antitrust Litigants , 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
221, 222 (1984) (“When I was involved with getting the airline industry deregulated,
we were quite hopeful that competition would substitute for regulation and that
much of the antitrust enforcement would be done by private litigation.”); Consolida-
tion in Telecommunications Industry—Senator Metzenbaum’s Views , 7 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) ¶ 50,126.  (“[F]ederal and state regulation of the telecommunications
[207]
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As this statement suggests, regulation and antitrust are mistak-
enly viewed as competing methods for correcting market failures.
This view of antitrust and regulation as substitutes suggests that if
a market is actively regulated, antitrust should play a minor role
and actors within that market to a great degree should be pro-
tected from antitrust charges.2  In contrast, in markets not tradi-
tionally regulated or that are in the process of “deregulating,”
antitrust laws are viewed as the primary means of enforcing com-
petition and protecting the market from exercises of market
power.3
However, the notion that a dichotomy exists between “regu-
lated markets” and competitive markets subject to antitrust scru-
tiny fails to grasp the crucial role that both antitrust and
regulation play in “deregulated” electricity markets.4  The di-
chotomy between regulation and competition breaks down for
several reasons.  First, the term “deregulation” is a misnomer.5
industry has been and will continue to be a poor substitute for aggressive antitrust
review.”); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia , 75 CAL. L. REV. 1059
(1987) (“I agree thoroughly with Judge Breyer that the antitrust laws are not just
another form of regulation but an alternative to it—indeed, its very opposite.”); cf .
Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating ‘Deregulation’ of Commercial Air Travel: False Di-
chotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Premises , 46 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 109, 116 (1989) (noting that dichotomy of regulation/deregulation “is false
with respect to analysis of regulation and deregulation of any industry, and is ex-
tremely so with respect to commercial air travel”).
2 Defendants commonly express this position via an assertion of the filed rate doc-
trine and state action immunity. See , e.g. , Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260
U.S. 156 (1922) (holding railway company immune from private action because rail-
way had set uniform rates approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission). See
also  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (holding that a California program regu-
lating the marketing of raisins was immune from antitrust attack).  The Supreme
Court recently has appeared to adopt the view that where a market has regulatory
oversight, antitrust laws should play a secondary role. See  Verizon Communications
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinker, 124 S. Ct. 872 (2004).
3 See , e.g. , William H. Read & Ronald Alan Weiner, FCC Reform: Governing
Requires a New Standard , 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 309 (1997) (“[T]he most practical
strategy for those who oppose the current regulatory process may be to fortify grad-
ual deregulation by superimposing strictly enforced antitrust principles upon the
current regulatory system.”); Ray S. Bolze, John C. Peirce, Linda L. Walsh, Antitrust
Law Regulation: A New Focus for a Competitive Energy Industry , 21 ENERGY L.J. 79
(2000) (“With the deregulation of both the electric and natural gas markets, how-
ever, the antitrust laws are rapidly gaining importance.”).
4 Carstensen, supra  note 1 at 116 (noting regulation plays crucial role in economic
order).
5 The notion that the term deregulation is a misnomer has been recognized, but
not the notion that regulation and antitrust therefore work as complements. See
Cudahy, supra  note 1. See also  Louis B. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition
in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility , 67 HARV. L.
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Deregulated electricity markets are in fact highly regulated, al-
beit the regulations in place at the inception of competition differ
dramatically from regulations in place prior to the opening of the
markets to competition.6  Nascent electricity markets have idi-
osyncracies that make exercises in market power highly likely:
they are still subject to natural monopoly tendencies (e.g ., trans-
mission of electricity) and consumers of electricity are not re-
sponsive to price in the short-term.  Because the physical
characteristics of the markets make “manipulation,”7 and exer-
cises in market power highly likely,8 active regulation is essential
for the proper functioning of these “deregulated” markets.9
Second, properly functioning markets and well-functioning
regulations designed to allow such markets to perform are essen-
tial for the proper application of the antitrust laws to nascent
markets.10  Antitrust laws fail to adequately protect consumers
when markets are first developing, in large part due to the uncer-
REV. 436 (1954); Stephen P. Sherwin, Deregulation of Electricity in New York: A
Continuing Odyssey 1996-2001 , 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 263, 270 (2001) (“The
term ‘deregulation’ is a bit of a misnomer in describing the changes occurring in
New York’s electric industry.  Restructuring of the electric industry may be a techni-
cally more accurate description.”); Jeff B. Slaton, Searching for “Green” Electrons in
a Deregulated Electricity Market: How Green is Green? , 22 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y J. 21, 23 (1998) (“In truth, the term deregulation is a misnomer; a more ap-
propriate term would be ‘re-regulation.’”).
6 See  Harry First, Regulated Deregulation: The New York Experience in Electric
Utility Deregulation , 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 911, 912 (2002) (noting that New York’s
electricity market was not deregulated, but in fact New York replaced “one regula-
tory system with another”).
7 It is unclear what “manipulation” means in the context of energy markets.  One
possibility is that market manipulation means a violation of antigaming provisions of
FERC-approved tariffs. See  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Final Report
on Price Manipulation in Western Markets: Fact-Finding Investigation of Potential
Manipulation of Electric and Natural Gas Prices, Docket No. PA 02-2-000, at ES-2
(2003), available at  Staff Report on Western Markets Investigation, http://www.ferc.
gov/legal/staff-rep-elec.asp (last visited June 20, 2004) [hereinafter Final Report].
However, no consensus has emerged among legal and economic scholars about what
behavior would constitute manipulations.
8 See infra  Part III.
9 For examples of actual and potential exercises of market power scrutinized
under the antitrust laws, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973) (refusing to deliver power over utility’s transmission lines); United States v.
City of Stillwell, No. CIV-96-196 B, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18203, 1998 WL 1120779
(E.D. Okla. 1998) (final judgment) (requiring customers to purchase electricity from
the city in order to purchase water and sewer service); United States v. Enova Corp.,
107 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (discussing ability of gas provider to raise prices
for gas in California market and thus increase profits on provider’s low-cost electric
generation within that state).
10 Carstensen supra  note 1, at 117 (“Regulation plays an important role at each of
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tainty associated with how the markets might appear at the in-
ception of competition.11  Moreover, antitrust is not a panacea
for market woes; antitrust cannot cure all market ills, only those
specifically arising from certain conduct by the hands of someone
wielding market power or by a group of individuals engaging in
price fixing or other anticompetitive agreements.  Thus, in the
context of “deregulated” industries, both antitrust and regulation
are essential conditions for the protection of the competitive
process.
California’s inability to successfully establish rules that would
foster properly functioning markets led to the demise of its elec-
tricity markets.  California’s foray into “deregulation” was a no-
ble experiment to determine whether competition could be
created in power generation on both a wholesale and retail level.
However, the experiment collapsed and quickly cursed the citi-
zens of California with brownouts and rolling blackouts,12
skyrocketing wholesale prices,13 and eventually a bankrupt util-
ity,14 a flailing utility,15 and substantial retail price increases.16
The descent from noble experiment to public folly was the culmi-
the four stages of industrial organization: basic conditions, structure, conduct, and
performance.”).
11 Robert R. Nordhaus, Electric Power Regulation: Making Partially-Deregulated
Markets Work , 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 365, 381 (2002) (noting reasons why the
“[e]xercise of market power in partially regulated electric power markets is not
readily constrained by antitrust enforcement”).  One of the goals of antitrust law is
to prevent increases in market power resulting from mergers or anticompetitive be-
havior.  If a market begins with a monopoly, antitrust policy is ineffective.
12 Kathleen Davis, Mother Nature K-Os San Diego Market, Price Cap Fervor St-
ings Like a Bee , 78:8 ELEC. LIGHT & POWER 1 (2000).
13 For example, in December of 2000, prices at wholesale rose to $1400/MWh, or
20 times the price level of December 1999.  William A. Borders, Note, Learning
from the Storm: Lessons for Illinois Following California’s Experience with Electric-
ity Restructuring , 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 333, 347 n.91 (2001).
14 Pacific Gas & Electric filed for bankruptcy on April 6, 2001.  Norman A. Peder-
sen, Power Play: California is Constrained in its Ability to Respond to the Energy
Crisis by the Doctrine of Federal Preemption , L.A. LAWYER, Apr. 2002, at 28, availa-
ble at  http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol25No2/1111.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2004).
See also  Tim Reiterman et al., PG&E Declares Bankruptcy; State’s Crisis Plan Col-
lapse , L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A1, available at  2001 WL 2476433.
15 Richard D. Cudahy, Electric Deregulation After California: Down But Not Out ,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 345 n.47 (2002) (noting that Southern California Edison
resisted bankruptcy only after pleas from state officials). See also  Michael A. Yuf-
fee, California’s Electricity Crisis: How Best to Respond to the “Perfect Storm ,” 22
ENERGY L.J. 65, 71 (2001) (noting that capped retail rates combined with escalating
wholesale prices caused utility insolvency).
16 The California Public Utilities Commission eventually ordered a forty to fifty
percent rate hike to pay for California’s power needs. See Rate Hikes Ignite Wide-
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nation of relatively unexceptional conditions that allowed for the
exercise of pre-existing market power.17  Because California’s
regulatory structure to some degree promoted conduct that
would create higher prices, it discouraged other conduct that
would have led to price reductions.  In hindsight, it was not a
question of “if,” but “when” market power would be exercised,
because the market rules created perverse incentives for market
participants and the antitrust laws were powerless to restrain
such conduct.
In 2000, as conditions in California became progressively
worse, regulators, the public, and utilities searched for someone
(besides themselves) to blame for the increasingly poor condi-
tions they were experiencing in their relatively young “competi-
tive” energy markets.  With the erupting Enron accounting
scandal,18 and with documents describing trading strategies with
such sinister names as “Fat Boy,” “Get Shorty,” and “Death
Star,” it seemed as if Californians had indeed found the cause of
the crises.19  Senators from California called for an antitrust in-
vestigation of Enron,20 and the Governor of the state proclaimed
all Texas utilities, many of which controlled some portion of gen-
spread Protests, Yet Are Unlikely to Resolve Calif. Crisis , PLATTS ELEC. UTIL. WEEK,
Apr. 2, 2001, at 1.
17 Many commentators have characterized the conditions in California as “the
perfect storm.” See , e.g. , Borders, supra  note 13; Yuffee, supra  note 15; David J.
Hayes, Energy Again—But With A Kicker , 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 215, 218
(2002) (stating that “an unusual set of circumstances in the western electricity mar-
kets arguably has combined in the past year to create ‘the perfect storm’ that has
wreaked havoc in the state”).  Others disagree:
That “perfect storm” metaphor irks me to no end.  I maintain, and this
essay is designed to illustrate, that what brought Enron down—at least as
far as we know—wasn’t a once-in-a-lifetime alignment of elements beyond
its control.  Rather, Enron’s demise was a synergistic combination of
human errors and hubris: a “Titanic” miscalculation, rather than a “perfect
storm.”
Nancy B. Rapaport, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Enron, Titanic, and
the Perfect Storm , 71 FORD. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2003).  The authors disagree with
the view that California’s market crisis constituted the perfect anything.  In any
event, the primary condition that caused the crisis, increasing demand eroding away
at excess capacity, was well known before competition even took place. See infra
Section IV.
18 See generally  Nancy B. Rapaport & Bala G. Dharenj, ENRON: CORPORATE
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (2004).
19 Michael Liedtke, California May Seek Enron Remedy , AP ONLINE, May 8,
2002, available at  2002 WL 20250230 (quoting an attorney representing the state as
stating that the Enron memos describing these strategies are “a smoking gun con-
nected to a wagon filled with smoking guns”).
20 Dena Bunis, Senator Calls for Counsel to Investigate Manipulation of California
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eration capacity in California—to be evil.21
The primary contention of this Article is that California’s
failed “deregulation” experiment arose largely from the failure
of California to create properly functioning market rules, lack of
diligence in market oversight, and the expectation that antitrust
law would cure that which it was not designed to cure: market ills
cultivated by regulatory rules that legitimized anticompetitive
conduct and made that conduct the norm.  In the context of the
regulatory environment developed in California, this Article ex-
amines the merits of allegations that Enron exercised market
power in violation of antitrust laws.  The key question is whether
the exercise of market power was unlawful under sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.22
This Article begins by examining the competitive conditions of
markets and the history of the development of California’s
wholesale and retail markets.  This Article then describes how
California’s markets functioned, followed by a description of
how the initial successes of market mechanisms later became se-
rious market failures.  This Article then discusses the allegations
against Enron, as well as other potential anticompetitive conduct
that might have led to the collapse of the market.  This Article
concludes that while evidence for the most part is lacking thus far
as to antitrust violations by Enron, the evidence does point to
failures by California’s regulators, utilities, and the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to plan for and guard
against exercises of market power.  Moreover, some evidence
points to potential antitrust misconduct by others, although that
Energy Market , ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, May 16, 2002; Senators Want Slew of
New Post-Enron Measures, Probes , MEGAWATT DAILY, May 17, 2002, at 7.
21 See  Ed Mendel, Davis Intensifies Attacks on Texas Firms , SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., May 19, 2001, at A3 (“We are literally in a war with energy companies who
are price-gouging us,” Davis told reporters while responding to Bush’s energy plan
this week.  “Many of those companies are in Texas.”).  The hostility in California
towards Texas generators reached new heights when California Attorney General
Bill Lockyer stated, “I would love to personally escort [Enron Chairman Kenneth
Lay] to an 8-by-10 cell, that he could share with a tatooed dude who says, ‘Hi, my
name is Spike, honey.’”  Vincent J. Schodolski, State of Outages Awaits President;
Bush, Gov. Davis to Discuss Energy Woes in California , CHI. TRIB., May 28, 2001, at
N6.
22 See  Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust En-
forcement in the California Electricity Crisis , 55 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (2003) (arguing
that Sherman Act enforcement by private actors against energy companies would be
barred by the filed rate doctrine).  While private actors cannot collect treble dam-
ages against energy companies, federal antitrust enforcement seeking injunctive re-
lief would not encounter this difficulty.
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evidence, to date, is far from conclusive.  This Article then sug-
gests methods of regulation that would minimize market abuses,
and what roles market regulators and antitrust enforcers would
play in such a world.
The implication of this analysis is fourfold.  First, regulation
and antitrust are complements essential to sensible regulation of
power markets.23  As such, a regulatory failure may expose mar-
ket flaws that are not remedied by antitrust enforcement.  Simi-
larly, antitrust does not protect against exercises in market power
in yet-to-be created markets, and regulation is an essential pro-
tection against such exercises.  Second, the nature of the market
structure governs and determines the nature of conduct that is
illegal under the antitrust laws.  Third, the concepts of “deregula-
23 By stating that antitrust and regulation are complements in a “deregulated”
industry we mean that the traditional view of deregulation—that markets should be
left to operate independently with only antitrust as the background rule—is inappro-
priate here.  The proper functioning of a “deregulated” market requires the estab-
lishment of proper regulation to cure anticompetitive ills beyond the reach of
antitrust laws.  Without proper regulation, market failures may exist that are beyond
the reach of antitrust. See , e.g ., Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872 (2004).  In Trinko , the Supreme Court refused to extend
protection to plaintiffs who alleged that Verizon violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act by not providing competing local exchange carriers with access to operations
support systems, “a set of systems used by incumbent LECs to provide services to
customers and ensure quality.” Id . at 876.  The Court noted in part that the regu-
lated nature of the market in question was a factor in its consideration of whether to
extend section 2 protection to the case at hand:
One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory struc-
ture designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm.  Where such a
structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust
enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the
antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.  Where, by contrast,
“[t]here is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs the an-
titrust function,” Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 358, 10
L. Ed. 2d 389, 83 S. Ct. 1246 (1963), the benefits of antitrust are worth its
sometimes considerable disadvantages.  Just as regulatory context may in
other cases serve as a basis for implied immunity, it may also be a consider-
ation in deciding whether to recognize an expansion of the contours of § 2.
Id . at 881 (citation omitted).  The Court went on to note that the problem alleged
was better suited to regulatory remedy than antitrust remedy:
Effective remediation of violations of regulatory sharing requirements will
ordinarily require continuing supervision of a highly detailed decree.  We
think that Professor Areeda got it exactly right: “No court should impose a
duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise.
The problem should be deemed irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when com-
pulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls charac-
teristic of a regulatory agency.”
Id . at 883.
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tion” and “competition” are seriously misleading,24 and the rhet-
oric of deregulation should instill a notion of regulated
competition such that regulators, legislators, and antitrust enforc-
ers understand their roles as being complementary.  Finally, the
points considered above have serious implications for not only
the deregulation of the energy industry in the future, but also the
deregulation of any industry where it is hoped that market mech-
anisms might supplant regulation.
I
HISTORY OF MARKET DEVELOPMENT
A. The Trend Toward Deregulation
The movement toward deregulation and the beginning of Cali-
fornia’s electricity experiment began at the federal level with the
passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978
(PURPA) and private integration between utilities.25  While
neither of these measures was designed to create competition in
wholesale energy markets, the unintended consequence of these
two actions was the creation of wholesale power markets and a
tremendous incentive for some state legislators to deregulate
wholesale power markets.26
Congress passed PURPA in reaction to the energy crises of the
1970s as a measure to decrease the nation’s dependence upon
foreign oil reserves, promote a more diversified U.S. energy mar-
ket, and promote the use of efficient alternative energy re-
sources.27  Under PURPA, investor-owned utilities were
required to purchase energy from non-utility qualifying facilities
24 See , e.g.,  Sherwin, supra  note 5, at 270 (indicating preference for term electric-
ity restructuring).
25 The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat.
3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C.). See also  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742 (1982).
26 See generally  Darren David Bush, Creating Competition in Electricity Genera-
tion: Reconciling the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 with the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah) (on
file with author).
27 Id.  at 35.  Utilities during the early 1970s typically sought to construct large-
capacity coal or nuclear plants.  Construction costs for these plants were substantial,
while the marginal cost of energy production for these plants was low.  As energy
prices soared in the 1970s, utilities were denied recovery on these large capacity
plants, creating disincentives for the construction of new generation. See generally
id .
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(QFs)28 at “avoided cost”29 rates that were to be set by state reg-
ulation, subject to federal guidelines.30  Utilities were also re-
quired to “make such interconnections with any qualifying
facility as may be necessary to accomplish purchases or sales.”31
In short, utilities were required to buy power from QFs and in-
terconnect the QFs to the utility grid.32  The rates, while designed
to equal the utility’s avoided cost, were in many states—includ-
ing California—much higher than the utility’s avoided cost.33
The inflation of the avoided cost rate was designed to promote
growth in energy-efficient generation, but at the same time in-
creased retail rates beyond what they would have been had the
utility built its own generation.  As a result, states like California,
New York, and others faced excessive retail rates because of the
inflated avoided cost calculations they undertook.34
The intent behind the avoided cost rate scale and interconnec-
tion requirement was not to develop competition in wholesale
power generation, but rather to protect privileged QFs from the
monopsony power of the utility.35  However, the potential for
higher-than-normal profits brought about new entrepreneurial
endeavors into the wholesale electricity market.  Theoretically,
28 A “qualifying facility” meant meeting federal guidelines for size, operating effi-
ciency, or efficient generation. See  18 C.F.R. § 292.205 (1983).
29 The use of avoided costs as a determinant of electricity rates represents a shift
of focus from the seller’s cost to the purchaser’s cost.  The QF was paid a rate that
(ambiguously) represented the likely costs for both energy and facilities that the
utility would have incurred had it produced the generating capacity itself.  Since this
is an opportunity cost, there is no economic model that can capture its true value.
Therefore, states were allowed to set the avoided cost rates themselves.  There was a
ceiling on the avoided cost rate implied by the congressional statement that these
rates would be “just and reasonable to consumers of the utility, in the public inter-
est, and non-discriminatory, or the incremental cost of alternative electric energy.”
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1750, at 89 (1978). See also  Steven R. Miles, Note, Full-Avoided
Cost Pricing Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: “Just and Reasonable”
to Electric Consumers? , 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1267 (1984).
30 See  45 Fed. Reg. 12,215 (1980). See also  18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b) (1983).
31 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (1983).
32 Prior to this, utilities opposed interconnection to independent generators be-
cause of fear that increased networking would cause a loss in reliability and compro-
mise the integrity of transmission.  Of course, there may have also been the
competitive concern about the existence of a competitor on the utility’s grid.
33 See  Bush, supra  note 26, at 94–99 (noting difficulties with administratively de-
termined avoided cost rates).
34 While FERC was not free to endorse rates in excess of avoided cost, courts
have determined that states were not required to keep QF incentives at the avoided
cost rate. See STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER: DEVELOPMENT,
COGENERATION, UTILITY REGULATION 7-19 (1989).
35 Bush, supra  note 26, at 45-46.
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however, incentives for entry only existed up until the point that
the new generator’s marginal costs equaled those of the utilities,
and the traditional barriers to entry in electricity still existed for
non-QFs.36  Nonetheless, because avoided cost rates were set at
levels that exceeded the QFs’ marginal costs, and often times
even above the marginal cost that would have been incurred by
the utility had it provided the generation itself, potential QFs
were enticed by the chance to earn short-term economic prof-
its.37  The potential for high profits, along with an ineffective sys-
tem for identifying QFs,38 fostered inefficient entry by producers
seeking to provide capacity.39  Because of PURPA, competition,
in a loose sense, now existed between the utility and the QF for
the generation of the utilities’ energy needs.40
While QFs were induced to provide generation needs for the
utilities, the utilities were increasing the level of integration be-
tween and among themselves.  In the early stages of electricity
production, utilities generally were geographically isolated and
disconnected, requiring utilities to supply their own generation
needs.  However, some utilities were able to buy a portion of
their requirements from other utilities, although generally gener-
36 Id . at 89-90.
37 See infra  Part III.
38 There were many complaints that generators were attaching cogeneration
sources to their power plants merely to obtain the ability to require the utility to
purchase power from them.  These questionable QFs were called “PURPA-ma-
chines.” See  William W. Berry, Competition in the Electric Industry: The Influence
of PURPA, PUHCA, and Transmission Access , 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 32
(1991). Cf.  Douglas Gagax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Util-
ity Industry: An Evaluation , 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 77 n.36 (1993) (“A PURPA
machine is a QF which would not exist except by virtue of the requirement that a
utility purchase the power it creates.  Such QFs are totally in contravention of the
idealistic and optimistic purposes of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of
1978.”).
39 Because traditional rate regulation coupled with the existence of overpayment
to QFs fostered exceptionally high energy prices in California, the authors do not
advocate for a return to rate regulation.  It is important that policy makers in the
midst of economic crisis remember the underlying reasons for the change to “der-
egulated” markets.  In most cases, “deregulation” is motivated by a poorly function-
ing regulatory scheme.  However, many have advocated for a return to traditional
rate regulation in California. See , e.g. , Gregory Palast, Utilities Need Regulation ,
WASH. POST NAT’L WEEKLY EDITION, Feb. 5-11, 2001, at 22 (“The only solution to
the deregulation debacle is swift, honorable, and complete withdrawal” and the cure
for deregulation is a return to regulation.).
40 Bush, supra  note 26, at 32.  In fact, it could be considered “competition with an
uneven playing field,” since QFs were granted a guaranteed market under the
PURPA rules. Id.  at 31.
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ation was not bought and sold between utilities.41  Thus, severe
and prolonged blackouts could occur where an intrastate trans-
mission line or major generation station was forced off-line.
Moreover, the importation of energy could not take place due to
the lack of substantial interconnection between utilities.  This
self-reliance created a vulnerability that manifested in the form
of such tragedies as the “Great Northeast Blackout of 1965,”
which affected more than 80,000 square miles and thirty million
customers from Buffalo to the eastern border of New Hampshire
and from New York City to Ontario.42
In response to the blackout, utilities began to increase inter-
connectivity in hopes of promoting reliability.  In 1968, electric
utilities formed the North American Electric Reliability Council
(NERC).  NERC’s purpose “is to ensure that the bulk electric
system in North America is reliable, adequate, and secure.”43
Under NERC, participating utilities and other industry members
are organized into ten regional reliability councils,44 based upon
41 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ENERGY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO
THE ELECTRIC AND GAS INDUSTRIES 2 (2002).
42 It took the Federal Power Commission almost a week to identify the cause of
the blackout.  Investigators found that the blackout was the consequence of a “cas-
cade” of problems that began when a key transmission line was disconnected as a
result of a defective relay at the Sir Adam Beck Station No. 2 in Ontario, Canada.
The faulty relay was the impetus for a sequence of escalating line overloads that
quickly raced down the main trunk lines of the grid, separating major generation
sources from load centers and weakening the entire system with each subsequent
separation.  On August 14, 2003, the midwest and northeast U.S. and portions of
Canada experienced an enormous blackout that affected at least 50 million people.
See U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST
14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 1 (2004) available at
http://www.ferc.gov/cust-protect/moi/blackout.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2004).  The re-
port identifies, inter alia, the failure of First Energy Corp. to follow NERC standards
as a root cause of the blackout’s ability to spread.  Thus, unlike the 1965 New York
blackout that was caused by physical isolation, the 2003 blackout’s widespread ef-
fects were caused by physical interconnection of electric utilities.
43 See  North American Electric Reliability Council, About NERC , at  http://www.
nerc.com/about/ (last visited June 1, 2004). See also The Electricity Competition and
Reliability Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House
Comm. on Commerce , 106th Cong. 243 (1999) (testimony of David R. Nevius, Vice
President of the North American Electric Reliability Council).
44 These reliability councils are known as the Alaskan Systems Coordination
Council, the East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement (ECAR), the
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the Mid-Atlantic Area Council
(MAAC), the Mid-American Interconnection Network (MAIN), the Mid-Continent
Area Power Pool (MAPP), the Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC), the
Southeastern Electric Reliability Council (SERC), the Southwest Power Pool (SPP),
and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC).  These regions comprise
the entirety of the continental United States and Canada.
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geographic location and physical interconnection.45  The inter-
connection of utilities via regional councils meant that, should a
utility suffer the loss of a transmission line or generator, it could
replace the power lost with power imported from another utility
within the reliability council.46  Because each of the participating
utilities had surplus capacity (in order to comply with NERC
guidelines), neighboring utilities could be relied upon to provide
such power.  The development of NERC and its regional councils
meant that energy could be traded between utilities.  Thus, a
loose trading platform was developed such that investor-owned
utilities could buy and sell power to other utilities.  PURPA facil-
itated this trading by ensuring a steady growth of excess capacity
to funnel into the wholesale market.  Thus, while PURPA was
designed as a way to decrease reliance on fossil fuels by moneta-
rily encouraging the entry of QFs into the provision of wholesale
electricity at excessive rates, it became clear that the passage of
PURPA and the creation of NERC had inadvertently developed
a wholesale energy market.47
When political unrest in the Middle East caused extreme fluc-
tuations in crude oil prices,48 it became increasingly evident to
Congress that the United States needed to further decrease its
reliance on fossil fuels.  Congress believed that competition
would drive wholesale rate reductions, increase innovation, and
force utilities to sell electricity at marginal cost.49  To this end,
Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) in 1992,50 which
introduced two major changes to the electricity industry: the cre-
45 The WECC and ERCOT are electrically isolated from the other NERC Re-
gions, apart from direct current ties over which power flows occasionally (and to a
commercially insignificant degree).  There are varying degrees of interconnection
between the remainder of the NERC regions.  Thus, it is said that there is a “West-
ern Interconnect,” an “Eastern Interconnect,” and a “Texas Interconnect.” PETER
C. CHRISTENSEN, RETAIL WHEELING: A GUIDE FOR END USERS 21-22, fig. 2-4 (3d
ed. 1998).
46 See  Joe D. Pace & John H. Landon, Introducing Competition into the Electric
Utility Industry: An Economic Appraisal , 3 ENERGY L.J. 1, 8 (1982).
47 Bush, supra  note 26, at 133-34.
48 The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August of 1990 resulted in a significant in-
crease in oil prices.  The Department of Energy expressed President George H.W.
Bush’s concerns about this situation’s potential effects on U.S. energy markets in its
National Energy Strategy report. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL
ENERGY STRATEGY: POWERFUL IDEAS FOR AMERICA (1991).
49 Bush, supra  note 26, at 79.
50 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.
(1994)).
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ation of a new class of generators and required wholesale
wheeling.51
In order to further facilitate competition in wholesale electric-
ity markets, EPAct relaxed the entry barriers created by the Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) and established a
new class of generators called exempt wholesale generators
(EWGs).52  Generation facilities that met EPAct’s require-
ments53 were not obligated to endure the onerous regulatory
standards of PUHCA.54  In addition to increasing the possibility
of new generation capacity, EPAct also opened transmission by
requiring transmission facility owners to accept reasonable re-
quests for wholesale wheeling.55  The wheeling requirement
opened up the power grid for independent power producers.  As
the grid opened to generators, so did the ability of generators to
51 While utilities already had a general requirement under the antitrust laws to not
use transmission to maintain or enhance monopoly power, generators still found it
difficult to use incumbent utility transmission, as utilities often found reliability or
other justifications to preclude such use. See  Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366 (1973).  The Energy Policy Act amended sections 211 and 212 of the
Federal Power Act to allow FERC to order “mandatory transmission services for the
delivery of wholesale power.” See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra  note 41, at
24. See also Promoting Wholesale Competition through Open Access, Non-Dis-
criminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs
by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. § 385) [hereinafter FERC Order 888].  Since Otter Tail , essen-
tial facilities cases have been less than successful. See  City of Anaheim v. Southern
California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373 (1992) (explaining that the transmission inter-
tie was not an essential facility); City of Vernon v. Southern California Edison Co.,
955 F.2d. 1361 (9th Cir. 1992); see also  City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d
157, 161 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that plaintiff could have reproduced transmis-
sion line in question economically).  In addition to declining to consider transmission
lines as essential facilities, the courts have also been more likely to consider the
legitimate business justification arguments of defendants. See  City of Groton v.
Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921 (2nd Cir. 1981) (explaining that the
utility’s case-by-case analysis of wheeling requests was reasonable).
52 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (2000).
53 Facilities are eligible for EWG status if their generation and transmission facili-
ties are used in wholesale market transactions exclusively.  However, EWGs may
participate in retail markets outside the United States.  Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Doug-
las W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992: A Watershed for Competition in the
Wholesale Power Market , 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 472-73 (1993).
54 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a(e) (2000).
55 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j(a), 824l(a).  Requests for wheeling orders were evaluated by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  The FERC established a due
diligence standard for granting wheeling orders that involved the consideration of
reliability and property rights and licenses that may be needed should the order
involve the enlargement of transmission facilities.  Watkiss & Smith, supra  note 53,
at 481.
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provide wholesale energy to utilities with which they were not
directly interconnected.56  Together, the two provisions of EPAct
helped to enhance and make more robust competitive wholesale
markets by opening up the market through increased entry and
deliverability of power.
FERC furthered the movement toward fully competitive
wholesale markets on April 24, 1996, with the issuance of Order
888.57  Through this order, FERC attempted to increase competi-
tion in the wholesale electricity market by ridding the market of
“undue discrimination in transmission services in interstate com-
merce and provid[ing] an orderly and fair transition to competi-
tive bulk power markets.”58  This “open access rule” was
designed to foster competitive wholesale electricity markets, un-
wittingly created by PURPA and stimulated under EPAct, by re-
quiring transmission facility owners to afford competitors both
point-to-point59 and network transmission services60 under terms
and conditions comparable to those provided to the transmission
owner’s own use of the system.  These services were to be offered
to all  generation companies through transmission tariffs.61  The
expected results of this design were lower retail prices, increased
reliability of service, and open, fair electric transmission services
by public utilities.62
FERC Order 888 also suggested the creation of Independent
System Operators (ISOs) to facilitate and coordinate open ac-
cess.63  FERC sought the creation of ISOs as a way to reduce the
56 See Watkiss & Smith, supra  note 53, at 463-64.
57 FERC Order 888, supra  note 51.  At the same time, FERC required the forma-
tion of an “OASIS” system (Open Access Same-Time Information System) rule.
Open Access Same-Time Information System and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21,737, 21,737 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 37) [hereinafter FERC
Order 889].  Order 889 established standards of conduct for the emerging electricity
markets, and required public utilities to: 1) obtain information about their transmis-
sion system for their own wholesale power transactions, such as available capacity,
through the OASIS network, and 2) completely separate their wholesale power mar-
keting and transmission operation functions. Id .
58 FERC Order 888, supra  note 51, at 21,543.
59 Point-to-point transmission service refers to the movement of power from a
designated point of receipt (“source”) to a designated point of delivery (“sink”).
60 Network transmission service refers to the ability of a customer to designate
network load and resources and the dispatches as dictated by economics and
reliability.
61 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Bringing the Camel into the Tent: State and Federal
Power over Electricity Transmission , 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71, 75 (2001).
62 Id.
63 FERC Order 888, supra  note 51, at 21,551 (“[W]e believe that ISOs have great
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potential for utilities to benefit their own generation via discrimi-
natory access to the utility’s transmission system.  By placing con-
trol of the transmission system into the hands of an
“independent” organization,64 the exercise of vertical market
power (e.g. , the benefiting of generation via use of the utility’s
monopoly over transmission) could be minimized.  ISOs are sub-
ject to FERC approval under Order 888 rules, and guidelines for
the establishment and implementation of an ISO were provided
in the order.65
FERC further encouraged the use of ISOs through its issuance
of Order 2000 on December 20, 1999.66  However, due to how
laden the term ISO had become, FERC switched to the less en-
cumbered Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) terminol-
ogy.67  FERC’s RTO order sought to promote competition in
wholesale markets by eliminating the discriminatory behavior of
transmission line owners,68 improving operational efficiency, and
increasing reliability through the coordination of the RTO.  In
potential to assist us and the industry to help provide regional efficiencies, to facili-
tate economically efficient pricing, and, especially in the context of power pools, to
remedy undue discrimination and mitigate market power.”).  The term ISO has
given way to the notion of RTOs, although they both have as basic principles the
separation of control of transmission assets.  Thus, the notion continues to be that
the transmission system shall remain independent in operation, such that there will
not be discriminatory access given to the transmission owner’s generation facilities.
See  Joseph P. Tomain, The Persistence of Natural Monopoly , 16 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 242, 246 (2002).
64 FERC Order 888, supra  note 51, at 21,595.
65 Id.
66 Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 809, 818 (Jan. 6, 2000)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35) [hereinafter FERC Order 2000].
67 FERC also sought to be broad minded about how an independent transmission
entity might look.  Typically, two possibilities were given: (1) an ISO, or a non-profit
system operator, or (2) a Transco, a for-profit entity. See  Joseph P. Tomain, The
Past and Future of Electricity Regulation , 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 458 (2002).
68 Some studies have suggested that utilities engage in discriminatory behavior to
benefit their own generation even after FERC Order 888. See , e.g. , Narasimha Rao
& Richard D. Tabors, Transmission Markets: Stretching the Rules for Fun and Profit ,
ELECTRICITY J. 20, 21 (June 2000).
Data show that certain vertically integrated transmission providers oper-
ated so as to foreclose competition on certain days with higher prices,
which allowed their merchant function to continue to sell or even increase
sales into profitable load areas for prices that the market affiliates were, in
all likelihood, able to influence.
Id.  See also  Severin Borenstein et al., The Competitive Effects of Transmission Ca-
pacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry , University of California Energy Institute
Working Paper (on file with author) (noting that limited transmission capacity pro-
vides firms with incentive to restrict generation-output in order to create
congestion).
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order to accomplish these goals, FERC set forth, within this or-
der, a plan involving the creation of independent RTOs that
would follow the constructs of an ISO, Transco, or another (yet
to be defined) framework.69  These efforts were to be comple-
mented by the use of demand side management schemes, open
and nondiscriminatory transmission services, and pricing rules
for renewable energy sources.70  The idea was that the “synergis-
tic” effects of this multidirectional approach to market recon-
figuration would greatly assist in the full emergence of electricity
markets.71  The focus of policy had changed such that markets
were direct results of institutional changes, rather than uninten-
tional side effects, as had been the case with PURPA.
While FERC had encouraged the development of power mar-
kets via numerous mechanisms (e.g., wholesale wheeling, and the
development of RTOs), it did not attempt to define what effi-
cient wholesale power markets might look like.  FERC left the
development of market mechanisms up to the states, the utilities,
and the reliability councils.  Thus, a web of different power mar-
kets developed.  Power markets developed in California,72 Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, Maryland,73 New York,74 and the New
England states.75  Less organized power markets76 existed in the
Midwest, the South, and in Texas.77
With the development of difficulties in California, and with in-
creased difficulties arising from “seams”78 between different
RTOs, FERC finally stepped in and designed market rules that
sought to reduce market manipulation and the transaction costs
associated with transmitting energy across RTOs.  With the intro-
69 See  FERC Order 2000, supra  note 66.
70 Id .
71 Id .
72 See  Pac. Gas & Elect. Co., 77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,077 (1996); Pac. Gas & Elect. Co.,
77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,204 (1996); Pac. Gas & Elect. Co., 77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,265 (1996).
73 See  Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,257
(1997).
74 See  New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 99 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,246 (2002).
75 See  New England Power Pool, 85 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,379 (1998).
76 These latter power markets are not subject to a central clearing price and Inde-
pendent System Operator control.  Instead, purchasers of energy arrange with the
utilities to have the power wheeled across the utility transmission lines from a partic-
ular point of origin (the generator) to a point of delivery (the demand source).
77 Portions of Texas are now subject to retail competition, with tight wholesale
power markets. See generally  Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc., at  http://
www.ercot.com (last visited June 1, 2004).
78 “Seams” are the borders of different RTOs.  Transportation of power across
these seams may be difficult and costly due to differences between RTO rules.
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duction of its Standard Market Design Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (SMD NOPR),79 FERC sought to eliminate the pit-
falls and perils of regulating markets, and also sought to reduce
the level of “seams” between functioning markets.80
In sum, the movement towards deregulation of the electricity
grid on the national level was largely due to the unintended con-
sequences of regulations designed to create energy conservation.
The development of a body of law that sought to increase energy
efficiency instead fostered inefficient construction of excess gen-
eration capacity while it ironically increased retail electricity
rates beyond the level they would have been absent legal inter-
vention.  PURPA, combined with the interconnection of utilities,
created the development of a loose-market mechanism whereby
utilities could sell power to one another.  The efficiencies that the
loose-market system developed were further encouraged by the
passage of EPAct so that generators and non-utility sources of
power could participate in the market.  However, until recently,
FERC was a conspicuously absent parent in determining the pa-
rameters of market design, leaving states to devise efficient mar-
ket rules.
B. The Nature of Overlapping Jurisdictions:
The Regulatory Hot Potato
FERC’s “hands off” approach to market development, com-
bined with the traditional utility regulatory model, left the state
public utility commissions and FERC in odd roles when the
states began deregulating their energy markets.  On the one
hand, states traditionally have had a primary role in the oversight
of utilities on a retail and intrastate level.81  In other words, states
traditionally had jurisdiction over retail rates, the distribution of
electricity, and the intrastate generation and transmission of elec-
79 Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service
and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452 (August 29, 2002)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35) [hereinafter FERC SMD NOPR].
80 Id . at 55,455, ¶ 6.
81 In the early stages of electricity, the states were the sole regulators of electric
utilities, as most utilities did not expand beyond the confines of a state.  As utilities
began to consolidate, utility ownership crossed state lines.  Given state inability to
intervene in interstate commerce matters, consumers were left without regulatory
protection until federal intervention under the New Deal. See  Public Util. Comm’n
v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927); see also  Clinton A. Vince &
John S. Moot, Federal Preemption Versus State Utility Regulation in a Post-Missis-
sippi Era,  10 ENERGY L.J. 1, 9-10 (1989).
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tricity.  In contrast, FERC traditionally has jurisdiction over in-
terstate generation and transmission of electricity.  The utility has
been caught between the Scylla of FERC and the Charybdis of
state regulators.  For example, in California, utilities found them-
selves in serious financial difficulty arising directly from being
caught between state and federal regulators.82
Utility regulation was traditionally a state matter.83  The use of
state governments as electric utility regulators was sufficient for
the infancy period of the electricity industry.  However, state reg-
ulation fell short upon the development of the interstate utility
holding company.  This form of utility ownership eventually be-
came so popular in the early 1900s that by 1932, seventy-five per-
cent of all electricity produced and sold in the United States was
controlled by only sixteen utility holding companies.84  At the
same time, state governments had no jurisdiction over interstate
commercial activity,85 and therefore were afforded no control
over the rising utility rates resulting from the increased market
power garnered through interstate combinations.86
To gain control over rising retail rates and increased invest-
ment activity87 practiced by the concentrated utility holding com-
82 The difficulties of the utilities arise from California’s receiving from FERC ex-
actly what it wished.  FERC pretty much accepted whatever California proposed in
terms of market design.  And it was California’s decisions that prevented hedging in
wholesale markets by the load serving entities while capping retail rates. See  Bor-
ders, supra  note 13, at 347-48.  FERC’s reluctance to reverse the structure that Cali-
fornia itself imposed was likely the result of concern about how changes in the
market structure might exacerbate the crisis.
83 Vince & Moot, supra  note 81, at 9-10.
84 See  Rudy Perkins, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities and the
Limitations of Price , 39 B.C. L. REV. 903, 999 n.36 (1998) (citing JOHN E. KWOKA,
JR., POWER STRUCTURE: OWNERSHIP, INTEGRATION, AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S.
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 3-4 (1996)).
85 See , e.g ., Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co ., 273 U.S. at 83 (holding sale of electricity
across state lines interstate commerce).  The inability of state regulators to regulate
beyond state boundaries became known as the “Attleboro gap” –- absent federal
regulation, which did not come until 1935, the utilities were beyond the reach of any
regulatory authority.  David G. Pettinari, You Can’t Always Get What You Want—
Will Two Recent State Court Decisions Tarnish the Political Promise of Electricity
Industry Deregulation? , 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 501, 513 (1999).
86 See  Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy , 61
U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 359 (1990).
87 In particular, holding companies engaged in pyramid-type schemes with their
securities and the securities of their operating companies. See  Raymond F. Gordon
et al., Public Utility Underwriting Costs and Regulatory Climate: An Examination of
PUC and SEC Multiple Jurisdictions , 10 YALE J. ON REG. 17, 27 (1993) (“As part of
the pyramiding process, securities of operating companies were exchanged for secur-
ities of holding companies.  Furthermore, additional securities were issued by hold-
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panies, Congress passed two federal laws to implement the
Commerce Clause: PUHCA88 and the Federal Power Act
(FPA).89
The purpose of federal intervention into the realm of energy
was to close the gap created by state inability to regulate energy
transported in interstate commerce and an absence of federal
regulation.  This regulatory gap gave expanding regional inter-
state utilities free reign in their method of operation and invest-
ment decisions.  To regulate investment activities, Congress
passed PUHCA.90
Under the FPA, Congress conferred authority over interstate
wholesale electricity transmission and wholesale sales.91  In 1977,
Congress renamed and reengineered the FPC (dubbing the
agency FERC).  FERC’s jurisidiction is essentially an electron
flow test.  Thus, transactions between two utilities in a single
state are FERC-jurisdictional because electrons could flow across
state lines.92  In contrast, the jurisdiction of state regulators in-
cludes retail transactions, such as the setting of retail rates, rate
changes, interim retail rates, “the construction and siting of gen-
ing companies taking advantage of the pre-Depression speculation fervor.”).  The
holding companies also had friendly relations with investment bankers, who pro-
vided capital at will. See S. REP. NO. 74-621, at 56-57 (1935) (“[I]nvestment bankers
not only furnished financial aid when requested by holding companies, but solicited
it and came to depend upon holding companies for business.”).
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (2000).
89 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (2000).
90 “[PUHCA’s purpose] was to eliminate the evils then existing in public utility
holding companies, and to protect the public from the abuses inherent in them as
they were then constituted.”  American Natural Gas Co. v. U.S., 279 F.2d 220, 224
(Ct. Cl. 1960).  “The object sought by [PUHCA] is the elimination of abuses in the
public utility holding company field.”  North American Co. v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n,
133 F.2d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 1943), aff’d , 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
91 The FPA required that the FPC “provide effective federal regulation of the
expanding business of transmitting and selling electric power in interstate com-
merce,” thereby closing the Attleboro gap.  Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973).  Section 201(b) of the FPA gave FERC jurisdic-
tion over “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce [and] the sale
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”  16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2000).
92 Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 529 (1945); FPC v. Flor-
ida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).  Of course, electrons run like water, and
it is impossible to determine in reality which electrons are flowing where. See  Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 319 U.S. 61, 71 (1943).  Because of this reality,
the majority of transmissions can be considered interstate transmission. See  Donald
F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: Will the Electric
Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring? , 15 ENERGY L.J.
273, 284 (1994).  A counterexample is the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT), which is electrically islanded from the rest of the United States.
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eration and transmission facilities, distribution, and interstate
transmission.”93
Thus, while California was able to regulate its power markets
on the retail level, the wholesale power market established by
California was subject to FERC approval.94  The reason for the
distinction was that California, like most states, is not electrically
isolated.95  Thus, importation of energy across state lines was re-
quired, and therefore FERC approval of California’s wholesale
market was required.  At the same time, California could estab-
lish its retail rates without federal approval.  Thus, a regulatory
gap still existed, despite the elimination of the traditional Att-
leboro gap.96  The gap that existed in California’s regulation, of
course, had more serious consequences.97
The tension between state and federal regulation can be seen
in New York’s challenge to FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction over
certain components of retail rates.98  Under Order 888, FERC
required the functional unbundling of wholesale and retail trans-
mission services.99  It also required open access on unbundled re-
tail transmission in interstate commerce, but did not so require
for bundled retail transmission rates.100  New York had asserted
that retail wheeling transactions were subject to only state juris-
diction.  The Court disagreed, and held that FERC’s exercise of
jurisdiction over retail rates that affected interstate commerce
was valid, and its decision to decline to assert jurisdiction over
the transmission portion of bundled rates was permissible.  The
Court also said that FERC could assert jurisdiction over the
93 Santa & Sikora, supra  note 92 at 284.
94 Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy
Crisis , 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002).
95 Also, California increasingly relied on external generation to meet load.  Gen-
eration construction has traditionally been limited in California due to environmen-
tal and siting regulations. See  Mike Stenglein, The Causes of California’s Energy
Crisis , 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 237, 273 (2002) (“No power plant applications
were filed with the California Energy Commission between 1994 and 1998, largely
because there was so much uncertainty during the restructuring of the electricity
industry.  Add to this ‘period of uncertainty’ considerations regarding the capital-
intensive nature of generation facility construction and the often extended process
of regulatory approval for new power plants in California—and you have another
key contributing factor to shortage of electricity supplies.”).
96 See  FERC SMD NOPR, supra  note 79, at 55,455, ¶ 6.
97 See infra  Section III.
98 New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
99 Id . at 11-12.
100 Id . at 12.
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transmission period of bundled retail rates.101  The result, it ap-
pears, is increasing federal regulatory activity in areas tradition-
ally thought of to be within the jurisdiction of state regulatory
authorities.102
The resulting integration of utility networks, and the impact
that intrastate generation and transmission decisions might have
on an interstate level has lead to an increase in FERC authority
over wholesale and retail power markets.103  At the same time its
power had been expanding, FERC deferred authority over
wholesale power markets to the states.104  As a result, some
states designed wholesale power markets that soon were beyond
their control.  In California, this had significant effects.  Follow-
ing the California crisis, the trend has been towards greater fed-
eral intervention into state-specific power markets.  As
mentioned above, FERC has jurisdiction over unbundled retail
transmission rates.105  The Supreme Court’s pronouncement that
FERC could invade bundled retail markets has emboldened
FERC.  Recently, FERC promulgated its SMD NOPR that re-
quires energy markets to have certain characteristics that FERC
has found to be procompetitive.106  Unfortunately, this increased
federal intervention came much too late to save California from
crisis.
C. California on the Forefront of Deregulation
California was arguably the first state to establish a tight power
market at the wholesale level, and was also a pioneer in estab-
lishing retail competition.  The process of establishing those mar-
kets, however, reflects the tension between state and federal
jurisdiction and competing political motivations.
101 Id . at 27-28.
102 See  Laura Duos, Comment, Order 888: Has the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Invaded the States’ Jurisdictional Territory? , 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1213,
1233 (2002).
103 Of course, wholesale power markets directly and significantly impact upon re-
tail power markets, simply because wholesale prices are usually passed through to
retail customers.  California’s refusal to allow its utilities to pass-through increasing
wholesale power cost was a perverse exception.
104 See  Martin, supra  note 22, at 306 (noting that FERC “thought it could wait for
the competitive electricity market structure to be fully in place before developing
effective monitoring actions”).
105 New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
106 See  Pennsylvania – New Jersey – Maryland Interconnection, 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,
257 (1997).
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In 1995, California’s Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
faced pressure from both industrial customers and other consum-
ers of electricity to lower rates within that state.107  California’s
residents were paying on average fifty percent more for electric-
ity than the rest of the country,108 and predictions for future mar-
ket fluctuations did not indicate that any relief was in sight.  In
reaction to these high prices, many of the commercial and indus-
trial consumers were threatening to go off the California electric-
ity grid and import directly for their load or self-generate.  Many
had also threatened to relocate to states with cheaper electricity
costs.109
Under these immediate conditions and with the confidence of
success instilled by the initial results in Great Britain,110 Califor-
nia began blueprinting its steps toward competitive wholesale
markets, confident that the use of an ISO would solve all of Cali-
fornia’s electricity woes, and put the state at the forefront in the
race to deregulate.  In December 1995, the CPUC prescribed a
broad scheme for restructuring,111 including an ISO and a central
power market called the PX, both of which fell under the juris-
107 Dan Morain, Deregulation Bill Signed by Wilson , L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996,
at A3 (“California has moved faster than other states because of pressure from large
industrial users.”).
108 Id. See also  Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, Electricity Restructuring:
Deregulation or Reregulation? , 23(2) REGULATION 46, 47 fig. 1 (2000) (California
average retail electricity price was nine cents per kilowatt-hour in 1998, nearly two
cents more than the next highest retail price paid on average in the western states),
available at  http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n2/boren.pdf (last visited
June 20, 2004).
109 See  Duane, supra  note 94, at 489, explaining that:
The prospect of leaving the grid altogether to sign a deal with an unregu-
lated generator became very enticing.  Self-generation was also an option,
leading utility planners to worry about a “death spiral” of ever-increasing
rates as industrial customers exited the system leaving only those who
could not afford to exit.
See also Larry Foster & David Dodson, In Dramatic Step, CPUC Proposes Speedy
Move to Electric Competition , INSIDE F.E.R.C., Apr. 25, 1994, at 1.  The article
quoted John Hughes of the Electricity Consumers Resource Council as stating that
deregulation
is needed to stop the “economic hemorrhaging” in California as high utility
rates drive industrials to relocate elsewhere, generate their own power or
seek other options.  Electric rates for industrials in California are almost
double the national average and close to three times rates charged in some
low-cost states, including some of California’s neighbors.
Id .
110 See  Cudahy, supra  note 15, at 340 (noting California’s plan in part influenced
by United Kingdom’s deregulatory scheme).
111 See generally  Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the
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diction of FERC.  This restructuring plan, presented to the legis-
lature as Assembly Bill 1890,112 was forged from a series of
debates conducted under the auspices of the CPUC and the Cali-
fornia state legislature.  The plan was believed to be the ideal
framework for implementing competition in California.113  The
legislation passed unanimously in both houses of the California
legislature, and was signed into law by Governor Pete Wilson on
September 23, 1996.114
The California model was designed with the primary goal of
eliminating market power engendered by vertical integration.
The separation of the generation and transmission markets and
the eradication of exclusive dealings through the formation of
two independent entities, the PX115 and the ISO,116 ensured that
no utility could benefit its own generation via use of its transmis-
sion assets.  First, utilities were required to divest most of their
generation facilities.117  Second, market transactions were fun-
Portents , 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155 (2001).  California’s deregulation plan
was commonly known as the “Blue Book.”  Duane, supra  note 94, at 496.
112 In the 1995-96 Legislative session, AB 1890 was signed into California law as
chapter 854. See  Assemb. B. 1890, 1995-1996 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html.
113 Debates surrounding California’s deregulation at the time largely centered
around the best means of implementing deregulation.  One method would be the
creation of a tight power market comprised of bidding and central dispatch.  An-
other method considered was bilateral trading.  Cudahy, supra  note 15, at 339.  In-
terestingly, a major voice in the debates was Kenneth Lay, the former chairman of
Enron.  Duane, supra  note 94, at 496 n.92 (noting that Lay played a prominent role
in California’s restructuring debate and also that Lay “may have had considerable
influence over how FERC handled the California crisis”).
114 Assemb. B. 1890, 1995-1996 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).  Wilson proclaimed
the end of the electric monopoly and a new era of competition. See RICHARD F.
HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 259 (1999).  Some believe the unani-
mous vote was a sign that legislators lacked understanding of the implications of the
bill.  Duane, supra  note 94, at 497.
115 The PX began operations in April 1998 and was shut down in January 2001.
Robert J. Michaels, Venues and Markets: Regulating Competitive Electricity in the
West , 22 ENERGY L.J. 335, 340 (2001).  The ISO is still in operation as of the date of
this Article’s publication.  The PX filed for bankruptcy in March 2001. Id.  at 340
n.15.
116 AB 1890 included a provision for the recovery of stranded costs called the
“competition transition charge.”  Stranded costs were defined as “past capital invest-
ments, including power plants and other generating assets” that were inadequate or
obsolete as a result of the shift to competitive electricity markets. See  Colin Druk-
ker, Economic Consequences of Electricity Deregulation: A Case Study of San Diego
Gas & Electric in a Deregulated Electricity Market , 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 291, 296
(2000); see also Duane, supra  note 94, at 501.
117 The utilities were required to sell the energy produced from their remaining
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neled solely through the PX, meaning that all generators were
required to bid generation into the PX, and all utilities were re-
quired to secure power through the PX.118  This insured that the
PX would be liquid, but also eliminated the ability of the utilities
to hedge volatility through ownership of generation or long-term
contracts.119
PX clearing prices were revealed to all market participants,
and all generators received the clearing price.120  All purchasers,
of course, paid that same clearing price.121  Thus, the PX prices
were transparent, although the bid of each generator was not.
Moreover, this market was constructed in such a way as to elimi-
nate market power in terms of both the buyer and the seller.
Sellers were limited in the exercise of market power to raise
price, in theory, by excess capacity ready to displace a generator
attempting to exercise such power.  Buyers could also not exer-
cise market power to reduce price via a requirement to meet de-
mand with purchases from the PX or, in some minor cases, with
generation.122
The PX conducted market transactions through a double-auc-
tion procedure, meaning that it coordinated supply bids submit-
ted by generators with demand bids tendered by load serving
entities to calculate the market clearing price and quantity for
the day-ahead market.123  The bids submitted by generators were
in the form of a twenty-four-hour schedule.  For each hour, the
PX determined an aggregate price and quantity (MWh) based on
the price offered by the marginal generation unit that met the
generation plants into the PX.  Joseph Perkins, California Power Crisis , SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 26, 2001, at B7, available at  2001 WL 6439470.
118 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Institutions and Long-Term Planning: Lessons from the
California Electricity Crisis , 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 110 (2003).
119 Stenglein, supra  note 95, at 239. See  James Dukart, The Aftermath: Where to
Now? , UTIL. BUS., Mar. 1, 2001, at 51, available at  2001 WL 11848905 (noting state
prohibited bilateral contracts); Laurence D. Kirsch & Rajesh Rajaraman, Assuring
Enough Generation: Whose Job and How to Do It , 139 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 15,
2001, available at  2001 WL 10544658 (noting that the “restructured market design
virtually prohibited the regulated utilities from entering into longterm contracts”).
Eventually, the utilities were allowed to engage in bilateral contracting, but only
after the bilateral contract price converged with the spot market price at extraordi-
narily high levels. See infra  Section IV.F.
120 “The PX operated hour-ahead energy, day-ahead energy and block-forward
markets.”  Nordhaus, supra  note 11, at 384 n.61.
121 Duane, supra  note 94, at 499-500.
122 Id .
123 Id .
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predicted demand capacity.124  The marginal generation unit was
determined by sequencing the generation bids from lowest to
highest, based on per unit price.125
Load was again forecast on the relevant day, two hours in ad-
vance of the need to call upon generation.  One hour before the
time at which generation was needed, a clearing price was estab-
lished based upon the demand needed in this hour-ahead market
and the bids submitted by generators.  As was the process in the
day-ahead market, bids were accepted in order of least-cost up
until demand was met.126
Finally, a real-time market was controlled by the ISO for the
purposes of balancing small, real-time deviations of actual load
from forecasted load.127  In other words, this feature allows the
ISO to adjust for excess capacity or excess demand as the market
fluctuates with passing time.128  This real-time market was neces-
sary in order to balance supply and demand.  The California ISO
also operated an ancillary services market.  The ancillary services
market adjusted power supply in response to unplanned events.
Depending on the type of ancillary service, the power could be
brought instantaneously or within ten minutes to an hour.129  If
called upon to operate, they also received the real-time market-
clearing price.130
124 Id .
125 For example, if demand for a certain hour is expected to be 120 MW, then the
bid submitted by the generator that, in order of cost, provides 120 MW of power
would set the clearing price that all the generators called upon to operate would
receive.
126 Michaels, supra  note 115.
127 The ISO operated a “real time energy market,” as well as four “ancillary ser-
vices” markets and two transmission markets—a “congestion market” and a “firm
transmission rights market.” See  Nordhaus, supra  note 11, at 384 n.62.
128 In the case of excess capacity, generators are relieved of their obligation to
supply electricity.  When a shortage is detected, marginal generation units are called
upon to compensate. See  Joseph P. Tomain & Constance Dowd Burton, Nuclear
Transition: From Three Mile Island to Chernobyl , 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 373
(1987).
129 The ancillary services market is in fact four different markets.  Generation
within the “Regulation” market could be brought to bear instantaneously, because it
is already synchronized with the grid and can respond to minor changes in demand.
“Spinning Reserves” are generation units that are synchronized with the grid that
can generate power within ten minutes.  “Non-spinning” reserves are generation
units that are not synchronized with the grid, but could be started and synchronized
within ten minutes.  “Replacement reserves” are generation units that could be
started and synchronized within an hour.
130 Duane, supra  note 94, at 499-500.
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Once Assembly Bill 1890 was passed, all utilities131 were effec-
tively required to purchase their power through the ISO and the
PX.132  This affected a vast majority of Californians who received
their electricity through the utilities.  Those with load who did
not purchase their power through a utility, such as municipalities,
industrial consumers, and commercial consumers, were still able
to purchase power outside the PX by signing bilateral contracts
with generators or by using the private exchange (APX), but the
transmission of that generation would still involve the ISO’s cen-
tralized system.133
Wholesale electricity prices in day-ahead, hour-ahead, and
real-time markets were unconstrained by forces other than the
invisible hand.134  However, retail rates were capped at ninety
percent of the previous year’s price.135  Retail customers were
given the ability to choose their generation providers, but few
were motivated to make any changes, as the default service was
provided at a capped price.136  Because the default service
131 Municipalities were exempt from this requirement. See Alexandra I. Metzner,
Were California’s Electricity Price Shocks Nothing More than a New Form of
Stranded Costs? , 52 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 553 n.101 (2002).
132 See infra  note 225.
133 Customers who purchased power through bilateral contract usually did so be-
cause they have relatively significant bargaining power due to the size of their
purchases.  The ability to work outside the auspices of the PX allowed for the
purchase of generation at a price lower than that of the PX.  The PX price would act
as a price ceiling in the initial formation of bilateral contracts, and would be espe-
cially fruitful for the purchaser in that the long-term contracts gave them the ability
to avoid the future price increases in the California market.
Municipalities led a “charmed” existence under California’s market rules.  Munic-
ipalities were exempt from the requirement to divest generation, the retail price cap,
the requirement to surrender operational control of transmission to the ISO, and the
requirement to purchase power from the PX.  Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 365 (Deering
2001).  Irrigation districts and cooperatives were also exempt.  This meant that al-
most one-third of California’s total load was exempt from California’s deregulation
scheme. See  Michaels, supra  note 115, at 339 n.11 (2001) (noting that municipalities
owned 40% of transmission crossing the state line).
134 Price caps were not imposed until the crisis had arisen.  See infra  note 220 and
accompanying text.
135 A.B. 1890 § 854, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, codified, in relevant part, at Cal. Pub.
Util. Code §§ 330-398.5 (Deering 2001).  The retail rate cap was set at $65/MWh.
Utilities agreed to the cap in exchange for recovery of their potential stranded costs.
See infra  note 172.
136 Retail competition was eventually suspended in California. See  Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., No. 01-09-060, 2-4, 8 (Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n Sept. 20, 2001), available
at  http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/final_decision/9812.pdf (last visited June 5,
2004).  However, California’s retail competition plan had died on the table long
before its death was called by the CPUC.
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charged the lowest retail price, other load servers were forced to
accept the ninety percent price or else be driven out of the mar-
ket due to competitive forces.137  The retail cap, of course, as-
sumed that competition would reduce prices from their pre-
deregulation levels.  Thus, the price cap acted as a political guar-
antee to Californians that their electricity rates would either fall
or remain constant.  The next section discusses the economic ba-
sis underlying the belief that electricity rates would fall.
II
THE EFFICIENCY OF ENERGY MARKETS, IN THEORY
Mainstream economic theory of competitive markets dictates
that in order for a market to be considered perfectly competi-
tive,138 four conditions must hold: (1) the product sold must be
uniform across all sellers, or, in other words, consumers are not
compelled to choose one producer’s output over the other based
on product differentiation; (2) there must be many buyers and
sellers, such that no one seller’s or buyer’s actions alone will
change the prevailing market price;139 (3) all agents participating
in the market must have perfect information; and (4) no barriers
of entry may exist for sellers considering entering the market.140
When these particular conditions hold in a market, then the con-
clusion of the theory is that market forces, compelled by an “in-
visible hand,”141 will lead the market price to a level that
137 Although price caps worked poorly in the California deregulation scheme,
they were successful in the case of New York, where the New York Public Service
Commission negotiated rate reductions with New York’s utilities. See  First, supra
note 6, at 916.
138 Perfectly competitive markets are considered ideal under the mainstream
“neoclassical” approach to economic theory.  When the conditions for perfect com-
petition hold for a particular market, then it is said that the market will naturally
produce an equilibrium price and production level that optimizes social welfare.
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION 56-57 (3d ed. 2000).
139 It may, however, only be necessary that the market be subject to “quick hit”
entry and exit. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 4-8 (1982). See also  William J. Baumol, Contest-
able Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure , 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1
(1982).
140 See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8 (2d ed. 1968) (stating that
entry conditions determine “the relative force of potential competition as an influ-
ence or regulator on the conduct and performance in a market”).
141 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937). See also EMMA ROTHS-
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coordinates the desires of both the producers (i.e., supply) and
consumers (i.e., demand) of the market.
The amount of the commodity that the producer is willing to
supply at a given price in a perfectly competitive market will be
dictated by the producer’s marginal cost.  In other words, given
the competitive nature of the market, producers will only be able
sell their commodity at a price that will compensate them for the
additional costs incurred by the production of that unit.  Any
producer who prices her commodity at a level above marginal
cost will be pushed out of the market by those selling the same
product at the lower (marginal cost) price.  Because there are
many sellers and buyers, and because the commodity being
traded in this market cannot be differentiated between sellers, no
possibility exists of charging a higher price than other producers
in the market.
Competition essentially puts downward pressure on prices un-
til that point at which the price exactly compensates the seller for
the cost of producing that unit.  At this market equilibrium, prof-
its are zero, and welfare142 is maximized.  The phenomenon of
zero-profit equilibrium is associated with the long run; in the
short run it is possible for producers in perfectly competitive
markets to earn above-normal profits.  For example, an external
source that touts the benefits resulting from the use of a certain
commodity143 may cause a sudden increase in consumer prefer-
ence for the commodity.  This increase in demand will drive the
equilibrium price upward, and producers will earn positive eco-
nomic profit.144  When an increase in profitability of a particular
market occurs, new entrants are induced to enter the market for
the chance of garnering a share of the short-run profits.  As new
producers enter the market, supply increases, driving the equilib-
CHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTEN-
MENT (2001) (noting Smith’s sporadic use of the term).
142 This economic profit includes both accounting profit and opportunity costs.  In
other words, when economic profit is zero, the producer is generating exactly
enough revenue to pay all sunk costs and per-unit costs, and receives the “normal”
rate of return for that industry. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra  note 138, at 239.
Economic welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus.  Consumer surplus
is measured as the difference between the prices consumers are willing to pay for
each unit of a good and the prices they actually pay (market price).  Producer sur-
plus is the difference between the price the producer is willing to charge for each
unit of a good and the actual price paid by consumers. Id . at 71-72.
143 For simplicity, assume the advertising campaign to be costless.
144 The amount of the increase in economic profit will depend on the elasticity of
supply, which is dictated by the nature of the producers’ costs.
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rium price back down.  Producers enter incrementally, as long as
there are positive economic profits to be earned in the market,
and eventually the price drops back down to the level for which
economic profits are zero.  In this sense, price acts as a tool of
discipline in perfectly competitive markets, and the laissez-faire
approach brings about the best possible outcome for both pro-
ducers and consumers in the market.
In contrast to commodities that might be subject to this perfect
vision of competition, electricity has unique features that limit
the ability of regulators and market monitors to rely on the tradi-
tional aspects of competitive markets.  First, generation typically
cannot be stored.  This means that, absent consumer price re-
sponsiveness, the only market mechanism by which to discipline
price is additional capacity available to generate at a particular
time period.  Future capacity, in other words, is not a substitute
for present capacity.145  Second, in order for the grid to function
without brownout or blackout, generation and demand must be
balanced at all times; no surplus or shortage can exist in the
wires.  Thus, unlike with other commodities, energy generated in
one hour of production is not fungible with energy generated in
another hour.146  In addition, due to the minute changes in de-
mand that occur on a regular basis, excess capacity must be avail-
able to respond rapidly to changing demand conditions.147  This
reserve generation is of varying qualities, making some reserve
more expensive (and more reliable) than others.148  Once a gen-
erator is running, its power cannot be directed over a particular
145 The one major exception to this is pumped-storage hydroelectric facilities.
These facilities use off-peak power to pump water uphill.  During peak demand
times, the water is released downhill to create energy. See, e.g ., Tennessee Valley
Authority, Hydroelectric Power , at http://tva.gov/power/hydro.htm (last visited June
5, 2004).
146 See  Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding
California’s Restructuring Disaster , 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (2002).
147 In actuality, generators are typically called upon to run with ten-minute notice.
For a discussion of reserve markets, see Report of the Electric Utility Regulation
Committee , 24 ENERGY L.J. 191, 215 (2003).  Regulation service provides for even
faster response times through automated generation control, which allows genera-
tion units so equipped to have their output increased or decreased on a second-by-
second basis to follow load.
148 Reserves are typically broken down into three categories: spinning, non-spin-
ning, and operational or 30-minute reserve.  Spinning reserve refers to generation
currently synchronized with the system that is not serving load.  Ten-minute non-
spinning reserve refers to non-synchronized generation able to become synchronized
and serve load within 10 minutes.  Thirty-minute reserve refers to generation that is
available to serve load within 30 minutes.  Spinning reserve is of higher quality than
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transmission line.  The electricity instead follows the path of least
resistance, and thus may flow over numerous transmission lines
at once.  This creates enormous network problems.  A generator
brought on to meet additional demand may actually decrease the
overall level of generation available to serve demand, as the gen-
erator clogs transmission lines and blocks out the power of other
generators.
In addition to these nontrivial issues, electricity itself is not a
homogeneous product.  Specifically, certain generators supply
power on a continual basis.  These generators are known as
“baseload” generators.  Nuclear power, coal, hydroelectric facili-
ties, solar, and wind149 are typical baseload sources in the North-
west.150  The generators that supply baseload power are not able
to “ramp up” or “ramp down” the power that these units supply
to any great degree.  Other generators supply power during peak
periods of demand.  These generators are typically natural gas
and oil-fired units, and, aside from in the Northwest, some hy-
droelectric facilities.  These units have the ability to ramp up or
down fairly quickly, assuring, along with generation-providing
ancillary services, that demand and supply are in balance.151
Another aspect of the heterogeneity of electricity is that gener-
ators located in particular areas are more valuable than others.
As stated above, a generator producing electricity may clog
transmission lines and reduce the overall level of generation.152
Another characteristic of electricity markets is that the end-
user of electricity is typically unable to respond to or know of the
the other two types because the generator is already running, and thus the potential
for non-start is minimized. Id.
149 Assuming wind is available.
150 Elsewhere, some hydroelectric facilities are often used for peaking.
151 Kemm Farney & Ralph Russo, Electric Power Outlook: The Cost of New Ca-
pacity and the Price of Electric Power (1998), available at  http://www.retailenergy.
com/archives/electric.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
152 This point can also be made with respect to transactions that wheel power
from another area. See  Paul A. Centolella, The Organization of Competitive Whole-
sale Power Markets and Spot Price Pools  (1996), available at  http://www.ncouncil.
org/pool/htm (last visited June 5, 2004).  Centolella notes:
The total loading of transmission circuits will affect whether a given incre-
mental transaction may contribute to congestion in the transmission sys-
tem.  Congestion in the transmission system may alter the dispatch of other
units, preclude other cost-effective power transfers, impact generation re-
serve requirements or reduce the reserve capacity of the transmission
system.
Id.
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changes that occur in the price of energy.  Demand, in most
cases, is inelastic due to a lack of information as to prices.153  The
consumer rarely faces the fluctuating real-time prices that actu-
ally occur with the constant adjusting of wholesale market equi-
libria through the hour-ahead market, the day-ahead market, and
ancillary services markets.154  Instead, retail electricity prices are
fixed at some (arbitrary) average rate.  In this sense, too, demand
is relatively inelastic.  Consumers, not being hit by the increases
in price during peak hours, are not forced to adjust their behav-
ior as supply tightens.  Thus, because demand is not responsive,
and because demand and supply must be equal at all times
throughout the system, excess generation must be available.  An-
other result is a high average price due to the volatility of de-
mand throughout any given day, and extreme peaking prices
during times of scarcity.
In addition, because demand does not change when prices
change, energy markets rely upon excess capacity from genera-
tion sources to discipline price.  There are three difficulties with
the use of excess capacity to discipline price.  First, generation
sources have different marginal costs.155  The reason why genera-
tors are different is due to the physical characteristics of each
plant.  A generator may use a different fuel type than its next
best substitute, ensuring differences in input costs.  Second, even
if two generators use the same primary fuel, the plants may have
153 There are a few exceptions.  In California, the ISO had contracts with larger
industrial concerns to cut power usage.  Such customers receive power on an “inter-
ruptible basis” and are compensated for the interruption.  However, most consumers
of electricity are unwilling to receive power on that basis.  However, it is conceivable
that demand, with proper metering to allow customers to determine price in a par-
ticular hour, might be elastic. See  Severin Borenstein & Stephen P. Holland, Invest-
ment Efficiency in Competitive Electricity Markets With and Without Time-Varying
Retail Prices , (U. Cal. Energy Inst. Working Paper No. CSEMWP-106R, 2003),
available at  http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/pubs-csemwp.html (last visited June
5, 2004).
154 There were some exceptions to this.  Some industrial consumers entered into
contracts with ISOs where, if the real-time wholesale market price of electricity rose
above an agreed upon level, the ISO would pay the industrial consumer to cut back
their demand.
155 Peter Navarro & Michael Shames, Electricity Deregulation: Lessons Learned
from California , 24 ENERGY L.J. 33, 35 (2003) (explaining that “market participants
will have different marginal costs of production which reflect factors such as the
vintage and efficiency of a given plant and its fuel source, e.g., a new natural gas-
fired, combined cycle combustion turbine will produce power at a substantially
lower marginal cost than an older vintage plant”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 32  8-NOV-04 14:36
238 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
different heat rates.156  Thus, one generator using natural gas
may require more fuel to produce the same amount of energy
that another generator using the same gas may require.  Third,
each generator may affect transmission differently and may
therefore possess different congestion costs.  Therefore, since
generators have different marginal costs, the ability of a genera-
tor to discipline the price charged (or the bid) of another genera-
tor is limited.157
In sum, energy markets have unique characteristics that fore-
close them from operating like other markets.  Electricity supply
and demand must be balanced at all times.  Because demand is
unresponsive to price, the only mechanism to discipline price in
times of scarcity is additional capacity.158  If excess capacity does
not exist, then the market will be out of equilibrium.  In addition,
the ability of excess capacity to discipline price is limited by the
physical characteristics of the generation plant and its location, as
well as by any transmission limitations.  Thus, generation sources
are not perfect substitutes for one another, leaving price dispari-
ties between sellers of generation.
It was hoped in California that excess capacity would discipline
price, even as consumers remained protected from the vagaries
of the wholesale market.  Market experts had also predicted con-
tinuing decreases in fuel prices, which would grant generators the
ability to recover stranded costs without putting undue financial
strain on the generation owners or regulatory agencies.  As will
be discussed next, the absence of excess capacity and the hetero-
geneity of the capacity that did function within the market left
the California energy market in an unstable state.  The crisis
eventually led to higher consumer rates, in contravention of Cali-
fornia’s goals.
156 A heat rate is a measure of thermal efficiency.  The hotter the generator runs,
the less efficient it is.
157 It should be noted that generators also have different fixed costs.  Generators
with high fixed costs tend to have low marginal costs (nuclear units, coal units, etc.).
In energy markets, these facilities tend to be price takers, bidding a price of $0.
Those plants with low fixed costs and high marginal costs tend to be single-cycle gas
plants and oil-fired plants.  These plants tend to bid in some relation to marginal
cost.
158 The fact that capacity disciplines price does not, however, mean that each gen-
erator will receive its marginal cost of production.  Generators with low marginal
costs may receive payments substantially higher than their marginal costs, even in
competitive markets. See  Severin Borenstein, UNDERSTANDING COMPETITIVE PRIC-
ING AND MARKET POWER IN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS, (UC Berkeley
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper No. CPC99-08, 1999).
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III
THE DEFICIENCIES OF CALIFORNIA’S MARKETS,
IN PRACTICE
While signs of impending trouble existed well before the estab-
lishment of California’s energy markets,159 problems within the
structure of the markets did not manifest themselves until sum-
mer 2000.  The problems that arose in California’s energy mar-
kets stemmed from a series of defects within the market design
and implementation: (a) a lack of excess capacity; (b) a lack of
demand responsiveness; (c) the implementation of retail price
caps; (d) the implementation of wholesale price caps in Califor-
nia and then across the West; (e) the pervasiveness of plant out-
ages in the fall; (f) the inability of utilities to hedge volatility; (g)
the inability of the insolvent utilities to procure power in the win-
ter; (h) the misconception that monopsony power wielded on be-
half of the state would lower energy prices; and (i) the wielding
of market power by generators.  A brief discussion of each defect
follows.
A. Lack of Excess Capacity160
As discussed above, California’s market model was based
upon the notion that excess capacity would discipline market
prices such that a marginal generation unit would be constrained
in its exercise of market power by the next-highest cost unit.  The
basic theory for this design was that the least cost producer
would generate first, followed by the second lowest, and so on.
Thus, dispatch of power plants would be welfare-maximizing.
Firms would bid based upon their costs, because they would oth-
erwise fear not being selected in the market, when the next high-
est cost generator might be taken instead.161  The price for all
159 The California Public Utility Commission had forecasted a net shortfall of ca-
pacity in the early 1990s. See  Michael Kahn & Loretta Lynch, California’s Electric-
ity Options and Challenges Report , Aug. 2, 2000, available at  http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
word_pdf/REPORT/report.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
160 See  Navarro & Shames, supra  note 155, at 34 (explaining “Don’t Deregulate
into a Power Plant Shortage”).
161 In other words, the existence of excess generation capacity disciplines the ex-
ercise of market power. Id .  In an imperfectly competitive electricity generating
market, the presence of real physical shortages may increase incentives for market
participants to artificially withhold capacity, which exacerbates the shortage condi-
tion and thereby sustains higher prices over a longer period of time than might oth-
erwise exist in a perfectly competitive market.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 34  8-NOV-04 14:36
240 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
generation would be set by the bid of marginal generation that
met the last increment of demand.
This system would typically provide competitive markets
where excess capacity disciplines generation prices.  If a genera-
tor bids too high, it might not get called to supply, and thus some
other generator may get paid.  However, California did not bene-
fit from excess capacity.  In fact, for some hours, supply no longer
intersected demand, or at least intersected demand where the
marginal plants were high-cost producers, causing prices to
skyrocket.162
There were two reasons for this problem.  First, the supply of
generation capacity barely grew in California.  In-state genera-
tion grew between 1996 and 1999 by only 672 megawatts.163
During the same time period, California’s peak load grew by
5,522 megawatts.164  Additionally, no new interstate transmission
lines had been built to enable capacity from outside the state to
supply energy needs inside the state.165  Moreover, California’s
generation plants were aging.166  For practical purposes, this
meant that the capacity factors,167 a measurement of the expecta-
tion that the plant will be on-line to supply a certain amount of
energy, declined as the plants became more frequently unavaila-
ble due to unanticipated maintenance.168  Finally, because Cali-
fornia is at the forefront of environmental regulation (or bringing
up the rear, depending on your view of the direction of environ-
mental policy),169 many plants were limited in their hours of op-
162 If supply does not meet demand, the result is a brownout or blackout.
163 Kahn & Lynch, supra  note 159, at 36.  Note that this figure is “net” generation.
That is, generation capacity may reduce the amount of generation that the system is




166 Id . at 39.
167 The capacity factor is the ratio of actual production to production capacity.
See  Leah Ayala, Nuclear Power Companies Suing the Department of Energy: A Le-
gal Remedy Magnifying Nuclear Ends , 3 NEV. L.J. 449, 451 (2002/2003).
168 Some have asserted that the relatively high outage figure for California’s gen-
eration plants indicates an exercise in market power.  However, older plants are
more likely to require maintenance, and need maintenance more frequently, than
newer generation plants.  Kahn & Lynch, supra  note 159, at 39.
169 Many power plants that serve California’s generation needs have been con-
structed outside California’s borders.  It can thus be said that California’s environ-
mental regulations have led to the export of California pollution.  For a recent
examination of California’s net import needs, see CAISO 2004 Summer Assessment
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eration and therefore bid high prices.170  Because these plants by
necessity had to recover all of their fixed and variable costs in a
limited number of hours, their bids were dictated by opportunity
costs—the foregone revenue that would have been received had
they bid in other hours.  In short, these plants operated only at
“needle peaks,” or levels of exceptionally high demand.
California’s capacity shortage was exacerbated by numerous
rules and regulations that had the combined effect of delaying
entry for numerous generators in California.  In the early stages
of regulation, it was taboo for utilities to continue to build gener-
ation.171  After all, California had spent millions compensating
utilities for stranded investment via the Competition Transition
Charge (CTC).  Even prior to the recovery of stranded costs,172
utilities were unsure as to what the competitive landscape would
look like.  This caused understandable reluctance to build new
generation for which utilities might not be sufficiently
compensated.
Moreover, the CPUC provided incentives for the utilities not
to engage in long-term resource planning.  Incentive-based
ratemaking, implemented in the early 1990s, provided incentives
for the utilities to forgo long-term investment and reduce short-
term cost in order to make short-term profits.  Capital outlays
reduced the certainty with which one could recover profits.173  In
contrast, short-term and immediate cost reductions guaranteed
increased profits.
Even after the (de)regulatory scheme was well-known, genera-
tion failed to enter California.  Investors likely felt that invest-
(Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Apr. 16, 2004), available at  http://www.caiso.com/docs/
09003a6080/2f/ca/09003a60802fca50.pdf (last visited June 5, 2004).
170 Generation plants may be limited in their emissions of NOX and SOX, emis-
sions common for coal and gas-fired generation capacity.
171 See S. REP. NO. 95-442, at 23 (1977) (noting that construction costs between
1970 and 1975 grew by 68%, compared to a 45% increase in the Consumer Price
Index for the same period).
172 Recovery of stranded costs refers to taxpayer compensation for utility invest-
ments in generation that would not be profitable to operate in a competitive market.
Given the lack of excess capacity in California, it is difficult to see how any impru-
dent generation might exist in that state.  The recovery of stranded costs was accom-
plished through a competition transition charge, which appeared as a line item on
each consumer’s electric bill. See generally  Borders, supra  note 13, at 343; Robert
C. Fellmeth, Plunging Into Darkness: Energy Deregulation Collides with Scarcity , 33
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 823 (2002); John C. Hilke & Michael Wise, Who Turned out the
Lights?  Competition and California’s Power Crisis , 15 ANTITRUST 76 (2001).
173 Kahn & Lynch, supra  note 159, at 36.
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ment in generation in California was a high-risk strategy.  They
were likely correct for several reasons.  First, potential genera-
tion entrants were instantaneously immersed in a Rube-
Goldbergesque set of rules and regulations pertaining to permit-
ting and siting of electric power plants.174  While a component of
these hurdles is environmental,175 other siting requirements must
be met as well.  For example, generation plants must undergo an
interconnection study to determine whether the addition of the
plant to the grid would adversely affect the grid’s efficiency in
terms of net generation resources and import capability.176
Regardless of the cause of lack of new generation entry, the Cali-
fornia “Challenges” Report indicated a result that environmen-
talists might find ironic: “The failure [of California] to build new,
clean and efficient capacity as demand increases means that Cali-
fornia is facing even worse air quality because of the need to
keep the old plants.”177
One potential substitute to new in-state generation is the ex-
pansion of transmission facilities connecting California with
174 Id .
175 Among the hurdles a proposed generation plant must overcome are the Cali-
fornia Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Clean Air Act.  CEQA requires
any proposed generation plant to undergo an environmental impact study, and pos-
sibly mitigate any impacts to the public health that are determined by the study.
This portion of the siting process could potentially cause extensive delays, because
typically all of the impact studies of all power plant projects using a non-renewable
prime mover could be subject to challenge by “Not In My Back Yard” (NIMBY)
groups.  However, no evidence appears to have surfaced that this indeed caused
delay in the construction of new generation. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can En-
ergy Markets Be Trusted?  The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Mar-
kets , 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1 (2004).
A thorough review of permitting since 1990 showed that major power plant
developers did not seek siting permits until California had adopted its elec-
tricity restructuring program in 1997 and the “rules of the game” were
known to investors.  After that date, all of the 23 applications for new
plants were approved by the California Energy Commission with an aver-
age approval time of 14 months.
Id.
176 For the old interconnection procedures and the proposed revised procedures,
see Interconnection of New Facilities to the ISO Controlled Grid , at  http://www.caiso.
com/docs/2001/04/04/2001040410114523946.pdf (last visited June 5, 2004).  The
CEC’s rudimentary data indicates that few applications were submitted prior to the
establishment of the market in 1998, and that generators did not start coming on-line
until 2001. See  California Energy Commission, Update on Energy Commission’s Re-
view of California Power Projects , at  http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/back-
grounder.html (last visited June 20, 2004).
177 Kahn & Lynch, supra  note 159, at 44.
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other states.178  In other words, even if California failed to build
new power plants, it might obtain generation from other states if
sufficient transmission capacity existed.  Sadly, imports were in-
sufficient to satisfy California’s problems even if the state had
built sufficient transmission capacity to meet load, given its ex-
isting levels of generation as hydroelectric power dried up and
demand in the rest of the Western Electric Coordinating Council
(WECC) increased.  Historically, California had been a net im-
porter from neighboring states.  However, due to the increased
electricity demand and decreased supply due to low rainfall in
the WECC,179 neighboring states have had less energy to sell to
energy-starved California.180  Thus, California was unable to ob-
tain resources from outside the state and was unwilling to build
resources inside the state.
Expansion of transmission facilities internal to California
would also enable California to supply itself with additional
power.  For example, the now famous “Path 15”181 constrained
power flows between northern and southern California.182  Ex-
pansion of Path 15 would have brought about a reduced need to
import from other states.  Also, because of transmission
shortages, California undoubtedly was forced to run some power
plants at lower levels183 in order to prevent transmission system
overflows.184  Additional transmission would thus potentially in-
crease California’s ability to ramp up certain plants to their maxi-
mum output.  However, siting transmission lines is equally as
178 Hilke & Wise, supra  note 172, at 79 (“Transmission and generation can be
substitutes, as increased demand could be met either by turning on additional gener-
ators or by bringing in power from more distant ones.”).  California also had con-
gested transmission lines running within the state, such as the notorious Path 15.
See infra  notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
179 Despite California’s undeserved reputation as an energy hog, demand in other
states in the WECC has grown by a greater rate than California’s demand.
180 See  CAISO 2001 Summer Assessment (Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator), available at
http://www.caiso.com/docs/09003a6080/0c/af/09003a60800cafcd.pdf  (last visited June
5, 2004).
181 Path 15 is a transmission path that runs north-south.  Path 15 is commonly
congested, leaving southern California and northern California electrically isolated
from one another.
182 Navarro & Shames, supra  note 155, at 39 (“[T]here were a number of times in
which there was sufficient power in the south to prevent supply disruptions in north-
ern California if there had been enough transmission capacity.”).
183 Environmental restrictions on plant operations also limited the output of some
generation plants.
184 Kahn & Lynch, supra  note 159, at 12-13.
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difficult in California as siting power plants, and thus there was
limited expansion of the capabilities of the power grid.
Thus, California actively prevented the entry of capacity and
transmission that would have operated to eliminate the capacity
shortages that it faced.  Additional capacity would have con-
strained price escalation associated with capacity shortages.
Demand also continued to increase, although at a slower rate
for California than for the rest of the WECC.185  Demand in Cal-
ifornia grew by eight percent annually.186  The result was a crisis
caused by capacity shortages.  If summer 2001 in California had
not been blissfully cooler than expected, the ISO had expected
that demand would exceed 47,000 megawatts while supply would
be at around 42,000 megawatts.187  With an import capability of
approximately 6,000 to 9,000 megawatts, this left a projected def-
icit of 600 to 3000 megawatts.188  In winter 2000, supplies were
limited as plants attempted to schedule maintenance after a long
summer of running flat out to meet California’s electricity
needs.189  The shortened maintenance period, coupled with low
hydro levels190 and plants shut down due to reaching their maxi-
mum emissions levels, caused the preceding summer’s crisis to
carry on into the winter.191
The increase in demand, unmitigated by any proportional in-
crease in supply, left California in the midst of a capacity
shortage.  This meant that its markets were no longer disciplined
by excess capacity that could limit the level at which bids were
submitted.
B. Lack of Demand Responsiveness
Additionally, California failed to take the step of providing
185 The WECC is an electrically interconnected region defined essentially by
those regions west of the Rocky Mountains. See  North American Electric Reliabil-
ity Council, at  http://www.nerc.com/regional/wecc.html (last visited June 19, 2004).
186 California Energy Commission, California Electricity Consumption by Sector ,
at http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/consumption_by_sector.html (last visited
June 5, 2004).
187 CAISO 2001 Summer Assessment, supra  note 180.
188 Id.  Importation of energy may cause decreases in the amount of internal gen-
eration available for use.  Thus, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between
the amount the ISO could import and the amount of demand met.
189 There are, of course, allegations that some plants were shut down in an act of
physical withholding to drive energy prices even higher.
190 Kahn & Lynch, supra  note 159, at 13.
191 Nancy Vogel, California and the West: Worse May Come in State’s Lingering
Power Emergency , L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at A1.
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mechanisms through which consumers would have been able to
respond to rising prices via changes in their consumption pat-
terns.  As wholesale prices were rising, few customers in Califor-
nia noticed.  This is because consumers were held harmless to the
fluctuations of the market due to the retail price cap.192  Indeed,
one of the goals of deregulation in California was to protect con-
sumers from the vagaries of the market.193  Because consumers
failed to notice fluctuations in the price of wholesale power, their
consumption decisions were independent of scarcity.194  This in
turn continued to produce bad incentives to frivolously consume
a scarce good.
More striking, however, is that generators are responsible for
responding to shortages, because demand is unable to respond.
As more generators are brought on-line to meet demand, prices
by definition increase.  Plus, on a hot summer day when demand
is at its peak, prices can spike enormously and without
mitigation.
Figure 1 demonstrates a situation in which demand in-
creases.195  Demand, unresponsive as it is to prices, is assumed
for purposes of discussion to be inelastic.  As demand increases,
prices rise rapidly as more uneconomical generation is brought
on-line, including generators subject to NOX and SOX con-
straints196 that might not otherwise have run.  Prices rise enor-
192 See infra  note 209.
193 See  A.B. 1890 § 854, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, codified, in relevant part, at Cal. Pub.
Util. Code §§ 330-98.5 (Deering 2001). See  William Safire, California Power Failure ,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at A31 (“California’s politicians deregulated halfway,
which is the worst way: wholesale prices were freed from controls, but retail prices
were not.”); Rene Sanchez & William Booth, California Orders Rolling Blackouts;
Governor Declares Emergency; State to Buy Electricity , WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2001,
at A1 (stating that the energy crisis was due to the “failure of a partial deregulation
plan, which allowed wholesale electricity to soar on the free market as it continued
to place caps on the rates that the utility companies could charge customers”).
194 Even without price caps, consumers would be limited in their ability to re-
spond to changes in price because they lack real-time metering.  However, some
price signals would affect long-term consumption patterns, as was the case when
California increased its retail rates at the end of the crisis.  See infra  note 203.
195 Figures are provided at the end of the Article.
196 Generation owners purchase marketable emissions credits that provide for a
certain level of emissions per year.  When these generators bid, their price includes
opportunity costs.  For example, an emission-constrained generation unit would not
want to be called when prices are “low,” preferring to receive a higher price for the
limited number of hours the generator operates.  In contrast, in California, prices
were so high that many emissions-constrained generators were forced off-line in the
face of fines for exceeding their emissions credits. See FERC Softens Cap on Cali-
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mously in these situations.  Blackouts, like those during the
summer of 2000, occur when demand does not intersect supply at
any price.197  During those hours, California was forced to en-
gage in a futile but desperate task to meet its power needs.  Be-
cause supply was unavailable at any price, California faced
blackouts and brownouts for many periods during the summer.198
Demand, oblivious by regulatory design to price fluctuations, did
not respond to any great degree.199
It should be noted that when retail rates were eventually
hiked,200 consumers in California began to feel the rate increases
in their pocketbooks and reduced consumption by fourteen per-
cent.201  This indicates that if demand had some method of relat-
ing to price, then the price spikes could be mitigated by
reductions in load.  Time-of-day metering might have enabled
California consumers to better regulate their demand responses.
However, it is unlikely that California or any other electricity
market will implement that technology anytime soon on a broad
scale.202
fornia Power Prices, GENERATION WEEK, Dec. 13, 2000, available at  2000 WL
16063588 (noting plants forced offline for exceeding emissions credits).
197 See infra  Figure 1.
198 On June 14, 2000, Pacific Gas & Electric was forced to interrupt service to
some of its customers (500 MW of load) for the first time in its history when a supply
imbalance occurred in the San Francisco bay area.  Kahn & Lynch, supra  note 159,
at 22.
199 One notable exception were the aluminum smelters in the Northwest.  During
days of high demand and scarce capacity, the aluminum plants would forgo delivery
of power they procured under long-term contract and would sell that power to Cali-
fornia, making a profit on the sale.  There were numerous consequences to such
sales.  While the resale of smelter power (and the reduction of load associated with
the smelters not running) helped reduce the specter of brownouts, the aluminum
companies were accused of gouging California customers by selling them power they
desperately needed.  Moreover, the aluminum companies were accused of using the
energy crisis as an excuse to engage in concerted action to raise aluminum prices by
shutting down smelters. See  Stanley Holmes, How Tinmen Smelt a Quick Profit ,
BUS. WK., Feb. 26, 2001, at 8 (quoting a Bonneville Power spokesperson as stating
that the aluminum companies are “taking advantage of the power crisis”); Markets/
Your Money; Aluminum Stocks Rise Amid Calls for Limits , L.A. TIMES, April 11,
2001, at C4.
200 See  Steven Ferrey, The Eagles of Deregulation: The Role of the Courts in a
Restructured Environment , 32 ENVTL. L. 297, 321 (2002). See also Rate Hikes Ignite
Widespread Protests, Yet Are Unlikely to Resolve Calif. Crisis , PLATTS ELEC. UTIL.
WK., Apr. 2, 2001, at 1.
201 See  Peter H. King, Surprise!  Californians Answer the Call In Crisis , L.A.
TIMES, July 26, 2001, at B1 (noting fourteen-percent reduction in peak demand in
July year-to-year).
202 However, California has already begun to reap the benefits of real-time meter-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 41  8-NOV-04 14:36
In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron 247
C. Retail Price Caps
One of the methods legislators typically use to “sell” the no-
tion of retail choice to their population is to convince them that
their rates will actually drop.  However, depending on the region
being deregulated, competitive markets may cause prices to in-
crease, decline, or remain the same.  Where demand is increasing
and supply is scarce, prices are likely to increase.  In California,
consumers were immunized against rising prices caused by in-
creasing demand and scarce generation.
California imposed a $65/MWh retail price cap,203 essentially
providing a guarantee to the state’s consumers that they would
not pay more for electricity once electricity markets commenced
operation.  Eventually, only Southern California Edison and Pa-
cific Gas & Electric were subject to this cap while San Diego Gas
& Electric was not.204  Thus, while San Diegoans screamed as
wholesale prices escalated and San Diego Gas & Electric passed
those price increases on to retail customers in its territory,205 re-
tail customers in the other investor-owned utilities service terri-
tories remained blissfully ignorant of wholesale price spikes.
The retail rate cap had two effects.  First, it ensured that no
consumer had any incentive to decrease electricity consumption
in the state.  It is to the credit of Californians that they exper-
ienced any demand-responsiveness at all prior to the sixty per-
cent rate hikes recently invoked by the CPUC.206  However, in
times of peak load, when demand reduction measures could have
drastically reduced wholesale prices and eliminated the need for
blackouts, demand was virtually inelastic.207  The only alternative
ing use by industrial customers.  Real-time metering caused industrial customers to
reduce load by 550 MW in the summer of 2002. See  California Energy Commission
Report to the Legislature on Assembly Bill 29X, available at http://www.energy.ca.
gov/reports/2002-06-27_400-02-004F.PDF.
203 Yuffee, supra  note 15, at 71.
204 San Diego Gas and Electric had already fully recovered its stranded costs. See
infra  note 242.  Complete recovery of stranded costs triggered the removal of the
retail cap.
205 Eventually, however, as prices soared, San Diego Gas & Electric’s service ter-
ritory became subject to the same rate caps imposed by FERC upon California and
eventually the rest of the Western Interconnection.  Borders, supra  note 13, at 348-
49.
206 See supra  note 16.
207 The ISO did have some contracts with some larger commercial and industrial
customers to allow some degree of demand responsiveness.  When demand was
high, the ISO was able to call upon these customers to cut demand.  However, the
contracts provided for only a limited amount of interruption.  The ISO, during its
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to control demand was to impose rolling blackouts, a meat-ax
approach in lieu of the signal sent by a properly functioning mar-
ket informing consumers what the price of their demand was
when they imposed their individual demand.
Second, the rate caps ensured that the two utilities subject to
them would quickly find themselves in the midst of a revenue
shortfall.  There is no mystery to why San Diego Gas & Electric
is solvent while Southern California Edison and Pacific Gas &
Electric are at or near bankruptcy.208  When wholesale prices ex-
ceeded the retail price cap, San Diego Gas & Electric could pass
the costs on to its end users while Southern California Edison
and Pacific Gas & Electric could not.
The rate cap also affected the nature of retail competition.  In
their efforts to sell retail choice, legislators sought to protect con-
sumers via two methods.  First, legislators offered “default” ser-
vice to those customers who do not elect an energy service
provider.209  Thus, no one was left without a supplier.  Second
and more importantly, the legislators set a “default” rate (a flat
retail rate set below the then existing regulated rate) to protect
those customers oblivious to deregulation.210  The “default” rate
is essentially the price to beat, because a price equal to the de-
fault rate will offer no inducement for customers to switch.  Con-
necticut, for example, set the default rate well below the
wholesale rate, causing little entry by energy service providers.211
In California, the rate caps served to squeeze marketers and ag-
gregators out.212  They could not compete effectively as whole-
sale prices escalated and retail prices remained flat.213  California
capacity crisis, quickly reached those levels.  Arthur O’Donnell, Unplugged; The
Struggle for Solutions , SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 28, 2001, at G1.
208 See infra  note 242.
209 Cudahy, supra  note 15, at 341 n.28.
210 Id.  at 341 n.29.
211 While this article uses Connecticut as an example, it is not the only state to
suffer from this problem.  Massachusetts, for example, suffered from the same regu-
latory failure and achieved a .3 percent switching rate after two years of competition.
See  Paul Gromer, The Standard Offer: State-by-State Evolution; A Look at the Vari-
ous Approaches Regulators Have Taken to Pricing Energy in Competitive Markets,
and How Some are Rethinking Those Plans , PUBLIC UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2000, at 42.
212 Eventually, load-serving entities like Enron withdrew from the retail market.
See  Dean Calbreath, Two More Electricity Retailers Pulling Out , SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 2, 2001, at A23.
213 Id.  (noting Enron’s withdrawal from California’s retail market due to the mar-
ket’s unprofitable nature).  Strangely, Enron tried a marketing campaign that essen-
tially was “buy one year, get two weeks free.”  This campaign failed to attract even
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actually guaranteed its residents that they would receive a ten
percent reduction in their electricity bill, whether they switched
to an energy service provider or not.214
The promise that retail competition will not negatively impact
consumer electricity prices has effects entirely opposite of its in-
tent.  In California, it assured that retail competition was nonex-
istent.  It also assured that prices would increase and that
eventually California consumers would experience the largest
rate hike in the state’s history.
D. More Price Caps215
In a desperate attempt to stop price volatility, California asked
FERC to implement a series of wholesale price caps.216  The
price caps were designed to prevent generators from engaging in
market power by capping the rate they would receive in the real-
time market.  However, due to the fact that the caps were at first
implemented only in California, the caps were largely unsuccess-
ful.217  Generators scheduled their deliveries for points outside of
California, where the wholesale price was still volatile and not
subject to a price cap.218  However, the ISO would purchase
one percent of the customers.  Ahmad Faruqui, Electric Retailing: When Will I See
Profits? , PUBLIC UTIL. FORT., June 1, 2000, at 30.
214 See  Federal Trade Commission Staff, Competition and Consumer Protection
Prospectives of Electric Power Regulatory Reform: Focus on Retail Competition
(Sept. 2001) (explaining statistics on switching and switching rates) available at  http:/
/www.ftc.gov/reports/elec/electricity report.pdf (last visited June 12, 2004).
215 Price caps are upper boundaries on the clearing price paid by all customers for
a particular market.  The retail price caps in California, for example, placed an
upper boundary on what utilities could require retail customers to pay for electricity.
Wholesale price caps limited the clearing price in California’s wholesale markets,
meaning that each generator—regardless of generator cost—would receive the cap
amount even if shortages ordinarily would have driven prices above the cap.  The
result, of course, is scarcity.
In contrast, bid caps are limitations upon the bid submitted by individual
generators (or generation units).  This latter type of cap is useful to limit the ability
of generators that set the clearing price (marginal generation) to exercise market
power in the manner discussed infra  section V.B.2.
216 In actuality, the price caps were many, and varied greatly as California scram-
bled to regain hold of its markets.
217 One measure of the success of the price cap might be how often the cap was
changed.  The initial price cap was a $250/MWh cap in the ISO real-time market.
The price cap was raised to $750/MWh on September 30, 1999.  That cap was re-
duced to $500/MWh on July 1, 2000.  On August, 7, 2000, price caps were reduced to
$250/MWh.
218 See  Debra Raggio Bolton, Restructuring of the Electric Utility Industry , 1274
Practising Law Institute, Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 303, 326
(2001).
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power from out of state at uncapped rates when it desperately
needed power.  Many generators began shipping power outside
of California and shipping the power back in at uncapped
rates.219  In any event, the price caps, until implemented through-
out the WECC, only caused greater desperation on the part of
the ISO in its search to find power sources and did nothing to
prevent the exercise of market power.220
E. Fall Crisis: Plant Outages and the Curse of Entry Barriers
The problems created by a hot summer, lack of excess capac-
ity, and low hydro availability continued throughout the fall and
winter of 2000.221  In the fall and winter, an unusually high num-
ber of plants were taken off-line.222  The large number of plants
taken off-line for “maintenance” may have been the result of ex-
ercises in market power,223 or caused by the delaying of sched-
uled maintenance due to a long summer of running at full speed,
a hot fall, and demand that did not drop as quickly as it should
have due to the atypical fall heat wave.224  Regardless of the
cause, the effect of the shrinking of available capacity was high
energy clearing prices and scarcity.
F. Inability of Utilities to Hedge Volatility
One potential solution that was available to protect the utilities
from the volatility taking place in the PX and ISO was to allow
the utilities to hedge via long-term contract.  As stated above,
219 See infra  Section IV.B.2 (discussing exports of California power).
220 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 95 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,418, at 62,549 (2001).
221 See generally  Kahn & Lynch, supra  note 159.
222 See  Duane, supra  note 94, at 513 n.140 (noting that during the period between
January 2001 and May 2001, 25% or 14,400 MW of California’s 57,660 MW of gener-
ation was unavailable during the rolling blackouts).
223 The ISO suggested that physical withholding caused approximately ten percent
of the price increase in 2000. See ANJALI SHEFFRIN, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF
STRATEGIC BIDDING IN CALIFORNIA ISO REAL TIME MARKET (Cal. Indep. Sys.
Operator, Mar. 21, 2001), available at  http://www.caiso.com/docs/ 2001/04/27/
2001042710505919478.pdf (last visited June 5, 2004); see also ERIC HILDEBRANDT,
FURTHER ANALYSES OF THE EXERCISE AND COST IMPACTS OF MARKET POWER IN
CALIFORNIA’S WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKET (Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Mar.
2001), available at  http://www.caiso.com/docs/2001/04/27/2001042710273418872.pdf
(last visited June 5, 2004).
224 See  Hilke & Wise, supra  note 172, at 77-78 (“Outages for repairs that had
been scheduled for the normally lower-demand winter period coincided with unusu-
ally cold weather.  Some other plants were taken out of service unexpectedly—and
whether these withdrawals were strategic moves to keep prices up is one of the
points of debate.”).
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California effectively barred its utilities from procuring power via
long-term contract.225  However, once the crisis began, hedging
proved useless, as long-term contract prices and spot market
prices tend to converge during times of increased spot market
volatility.
Hedging, loosely defined, is the ability to reduce risk.  The risk
here stems from volatility in the spot market.226  The utilities
were unable to avert this risk, and indeed until very late in the
game were ordered to purchase all of their power needs through
the risky system of the spot market.  Thus, the utilities faced the
fully volatile spot market without any ability to mitigate the price
spikes.
Hedging could have been accomplished by two mechanisms.
First, if allowed, a utility could have engaged in physical hedging.
That is, the utility could have owned physical assets, such as gen-
eration, which could have been used to decrease demand for en-
ergy procured in the spot market.  Utilities in California were
required to sell the power produced from whatever physical as-
sets they owned into the energy market.227  However, in Decem-
ber 2000, FERC issued an order that enabled the utilities to keep
25,000 MW of power they had previously been ordered to sell.228
Second, utilities could have hedged the risk of spot market vol-
atility through long-term contracting.  However, as with physical
hedging, California effectively barred utilities from engaging in
long-term contracting, even when the utilities begged to do so.229
Eventually, FERC’s December 2000 Order230 enabled the util-
ities to engage in contracting with power suppliers without going
225 California considered utility investment in long-term contracts “imprudent,”
meaning that the utilities would be denied rate recovery for such investments.  Cali-
fornia later recognized its mistake. See MARKET SURVEILLANCE COMMITTEE OF
THE CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR, AN ANALYSIS OF THE JUNE
2000 PRICE SPIKES IN THE CALIFORNIA ISO’S ENERGY AND ANCILLARY SERVICE
MARKETS, at 7 (Sep. 6, 2000), available at http://www.caiso.com/docs/2000/09/26/
200009261407245692.pdf (last visited June 5, 2004) (“With complete freedom to
purchase forward both energy and ancillary services from generation unit owners in
or outside the ISO control area, the [utility distribution companies] could have elim-
inated or significantly reduced (depending [on the] quantity of forward energy or
capacity purchased) their exposure to spot market price volatility.”).
226 Yuffee, supra  note 15, at 69.
227 Id.
228 FERC Issues Final Order on California’s Market Problems; Response is Mixed ,
FOSTER ELEC. REP., December 27, 2000, at 2.
229 Id.
230 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. , 93 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,294 (2000).
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through the spot market.  However, enabling the utilities to en-
gage in long-term contracting came too late for two reasons.
First, two of the utilities were already making clear that they
were insolvent.  Second, the long-term contracting market price
for power and the spot market price for power predictably con-
verged.  Because demand was inelastic, and because the spot
market price was fairly well known through the operations of the
PX and ISO, it was not difficult for the generators to negotiate
prices for power on a long-term basis that would have been un-
heard of prior to the crisis.231
The ability to long-term contract would have proven more use-
ful prior to the crisis, because the spot market’s trends were rela-
tively unknown, and the utilities were not as desperate for power.
Instead, the utilities, and eventually the state of California,
walked into the long-term contract market fully exposed.
California erred by going to the other extreme.  It recognized
that if utilities were able to sell and buy power under long-term
contracts, the spot market might not have sufficient liquidity to
function properly.
G. Winter Crisis: The Curse of the Insolvent
Recall that the summer shortages were caused by hot tempera-
tures, high demand, and straightforward legitimate or illegitimate
capacity shortages.  The fall shortages were caused because
plants were taken off-line (for maintenance and emissions rea-
sons).  In winter 2000 and early spring 2001, however, an addi-
tional menace to capacity reared its ugly head.
As Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison sud-
denly realized that their income was exceeded by their costs of
supplying power,232 each company made public statements
threatening bankruptcy and claiming insolvency.  Gas suppliers,
231 The movement of utilities away from the PX and into long-term contracts
eventually caused the cessation of PX operations.  Yuffee, supra  note 15, at 75.
FERC recognized the issue of long-term contract pricing.  It created a $74/MWh
price for a five-year 7x24 product (i.e., the price for a five-year contract to provide
power twenty-four hours per day, seven days a week).  Bilateral contract prices at or
below that level would be presumptively just and reasonable. Id . at 76-77.
232 California’s aggregate energy costs in 1999 were $7 billion, $27 billion in 2000,
and projected to be $50 billion in 2001.  Merrill Goozner, Free Market Shock , THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Aug. 27, 2001, at 27. See also  Rebecca Smith, Probe of Cali-
fornia Power Prices Begins, but New Plants Aren’t Seen as Solution , WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 11, 2000, at A4 (noting that Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California
Edison had incurred debts equivalent to half of their net worth).
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out-of-state generators, and marketers began to refuse to sell to
these utilities because of concerns that the utilities might file for
bankruptcy.233  This, of course, was a reasonable reaction to dec-
larations of insolvency, job and dividend cutbacks, and other
proclamations by the utilities.  A creditor to an insolvent com-
pany is unlikely to be paid.  And, because these suppliers were
owed money, it appeared reasonable to stop supplying someone
who had a history of not paying.234  By March 2001, the with-
drawal of these suppliers from California had crucial impacts
upon the state’s grid.  Rolling blackouts in that month were in
part caused by the refusal of these suppliers to continue to supply
power for free.235
It should come as no surprise why San Diego Gas & Electric
was not having the same financial difficulty.  San Diego Gas &
Electric was offered a cost pass-through that enabled it to pass on
the costs of rising wholesale power prices to its customers.  Thus,
San Diego Gas & Electric was guaranteed financial solvency236
while the other two California utilities, saddled with price caps,
were essentially guaranteed insolvency.
In short, power suppliers understandably would refuse to con-
tinue as unsecured creditors—the last to be paid when a com-
pany goes bankrupt—and instead would cease supplying power.
H. Monopsony Power as a Solution
California’s response to the crises of 2000 was to purchase
power for its utilities and the customers of these utilities.  This
move was largely necessary after regulatory errors, market ma-
nipulations, and weather conditions drove one of its utilities into
233 Chris Kraul, Natural Gas Suppliers are Refusing to Sell to PG & E , L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at C1.
234 Ironically, one of the gas suppliers that refused to sell to Pacific Gas & Electric
was a sister company.
235 Julie Tamaki, Small Power Firms’ Cutbacks Contribute to Blackouts , L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at A19.  Many of the larger out-of-state producers continued
to be paid because the State was using its sizeable surplus to aid the utilities in
procuring power.  However, smaller producers, including “green power” producers,
had received no payments since November of 2000. Id.
236 However, this meant that San Diego residents did indeed feel the effects of the
power crisis in their rates.  President Clinton offered low-income San Diegoans re-
lief from such rates.  Melissa Healy & Nancy Vogel, Flat Charge for San Diego Elec-
tricity Urged , L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2000, at A3 (“Help . . . came from Washington on
Wednesday, as President Clinton released $2.6 million for additional relief to about
12,000 low-income households in San Diego County and southern Orange County
that have seen their electric bills more than double this summer.”).
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financial ruin while another was on the brink.  In order to get
power flowing into the state, the state convened an auction, di-
rected by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.237
Strangely, California’s actions may have had the effect of in-
creasing the prices it paid for power.  The auction opened on Jan-
uary 23, 2001.  During that time, gas prices were high due to cold
fronts in the Northwest and Northeast.  Gas supplies were dwin-
dling.  Power suppliers seeking to bid in California’s market at-
tempted to line up gas supply before making a bid in order to
determine the cost of an essential input into the production of
electricity.238  With natural gas demand increasing for the afore-
mentioned reasons, generators were submitting bids well above
what might have been expected were gas more readily available.
Thus, California began procuring energy at top dollar.239
California, as it managed to procure sufficient power supplies
to endure what was predicted to be a fierce summer of blackouts,
capacity shortages, and high prices,240 received a bit of good for-
tune.  The good fortune was that the temperature in the state for
June and July was mild.  Thus, California found itself “long” (i.e.,
with excess energy) and was forced to sell the power at a loss.
While traders engage in selling and buying power all the time
(although they typically try to buy low and sell high), California
was an unseasoned energy trader and thus found that it was eat-
ing losses.241
Clearly, had the summer proven to be as predicted, Califor-
nia’s energy procurers, the Department of Water and Power
(DWP), perhaps would have appeared as heroes.  However, after
a painful two-year journey the state was not feeling particularly
grateful at a loss of $80/MWh.242  At the same time it was selling
power at a loss, the DWP raised its estimate of how much it
would cost to procure power through December 2002.243
237 Ed Mendel, State Will Take Bids for Electricity; Governor Hopes Web Auction
Today Reduces Prices , SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 23, 2001, at A1, available at
2001 WL 6438901.
238 Nancy Vogel et al., State Electricity Auction May Push Prices Up , L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2001, at A1.
239 Id .
240 CAISO 2001 Summer Assessment, supra  note 180.
241 See  Mark Martin et al., Attempt to Kill Energy Pacts Resisted; State Asks Re-
lief—Firms Cry Foul , SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 25, 2002, at A1.
242 Nancy Vogel, Surplus Power Sold at a Loss , L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2001, at B8.
243 Nancy Rivera Brooks, State Agency Raises Power Cost Estimate , L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2001, at C2.
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The goal of the DWP, of course, was to exercise some degree
of market power by using state funds to “bulk up” the state’s
electricity needs.  However, California made several bad assump-
tions in this process.  California believed that “bulking up” would
translate into monopsony power that would reduce electricity
prices.  That assumption was wrong for two reasons.  First, Cali-
fornia was not a monopsony; the same power suppliers could
very well sell their wares to other agencies outside of California
for higher prices (at least until FERC implemented the wholesale
price cap).244  Second, a desperate monopsonist is hardly a credi-
ble market threat.  It is akin to being the lone patient dying of
cancer and negotiating with the drug companies.  There may be
many drug companies competing, but “monopsony power” is
nonexistent.  Thus, it was unlikely that, after the rate cap, the
state’s procurement mechanism would achieve any reduction of
wholesale prices based upon consolidation of the procurement
functions of the three utilities.
In addition to acting as the sole purchaser of energy for the
state, California sought to purchase the electricity grid from Cali-
fornia’s three utilities.245  The decision to purchase was based
upon the belief that this would be the best mechanism by which
to: (a) bail the insolvent utilities out from under their debts; (b)
bypass FERC jurisdiction, because FERC was perceived by the
state as being unsympathetic and enacting mandates contrary to
the good of California; and (c) be seen as engaging in action and
perhaps even be perceived as saving California from the brink of
electricity disaster.246
Two comments should be made about California’s proposal.
First, Pacific Gas & Electric’s bankruptcy proceedings likely
quashed any deal Pacific Gas & Electric made or would have
made regarding the sale of the transmission grid.247  The grid’s
fate was now in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy, who was
244 We have not listed wholesale price caps as a mistake by California, because
whether a wholesale price cap is a mistake is determined in part by the duration of
the price cap.  If the price cap is credibly temporary, it will not deter entry and
should not make matters worse.  If the price cap is seen as permanent or likely to
disappear only to return again, then the price cap may deter entry.  In any event, if
the wholesale price cap is a mistake, then it is one generated by FERC and not
California and is thus beyond the scope of this Article.
245 Miguel Bustillo & Nancy Vogel, Failure to Buy Entire Network May Doom
Davis’ Power Deal , L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at A3.
246 Id .
247 Id .
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unlikely to allow for a fire sale of the utilities’ most precious as-
sets.  Without the sale of Pacific Gas & Electric’s transmission
system, the state’s plan to operate the grid failed: Operation of
two-thirds of a grid is not as likely to produce the same effects as
operating the whole grid, whatever the effects hoped.
One possible noble goal of purchasing the grid, and the only
one that actually deals with the capacity shortage faced by
Californians until the cool summer of 2001, was to enable Cali-
fornia to perform badly needed maintenance functions, such as
expansion of the now infamous Path 15.  Expansion of transmis-
sion facilities is of course both a complement to and substitute
for generation.  Thus, if California had been successful in acquir-
ing the grid, it could have focused on this aspect of acting as a
system operator.
I. Market Power
The issue that has been raised the most in the public setting,
apart from the lack of demand responsiveness, is the market
power possessed by generators operating in the California
markets.
To review, market power in electricity is exercisable due to a
number of phenomena.  First, energy is not storable.248  Thus,
market power in electricity has a temporal element not found in
many other industries, where inventories may be able to limit the
exercise of market power.  Second, demand in electricity markets
has been virtually inelastic, at least thus far.  Therefore, market
power is not limited by consumer reaction, as it typically is in
other industries.  Third, market power can be exercised in nu-
merous ways in electricity markets.  For example, market power
can be exercised by withholding capacity or by raising the price
at which the capacity is offered for sale.  Fourth, market power
may be enhanced in electricity markets because supply response
may be limited.  This is especially true during peak hours, when
demand is high and all available alternative resources may al-
ready be on-line.  Fifth, not all generation plants are created
equally.  Generation plants all have different heat rates and fuel
costs, and because of these differences in efficiency levels their
marginal costs are different.  Withholding of a generation plant,
therefore, may increase the price of electricity as the next high-
248 See supra  Section II.
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est-cost generator is brought on-line to replace it.  Finally, some
power plants have “locational market power” because they are
necessary in order to assure system stability.  A plant with loca-
tional market power may be called upon to run to assure voltage
stability or to assure adequate transmission capacity (e.g., be-
cause the plant provides counterflow).249
The incentive to exercise market power is twofold.  First, by
withholding the generation plant that might otherwise set the
clearing price for all generation in the market, the next highest-
cost plant is called into operation.  This raises the clearing price
for all generation in the market.  Thus, many generation owners
with infra-marginal plants250 have the incentive to exercise mar-
ket power.251
Most generation companies like to own a diversity of assets.
This means that they own baseload generation (generation that
typically runs all the time) and peaking facilities (generation
called upon in peak hours).  Baseload generation is typically in-
fra-marginal while peaking facilities are frequently marginal.
Thus, each owner of generation in California is likely to have the
ability to exercise market power independent of collusion in
hours where demand is at its peak.
If demand is not at peak, generators may have an incentive to
collude.  Suppose, for example, that if Energex withholds its mar-
ginal generator, which bid at $3, the ISO will merely call upon
Edisron generator, which bid at $3.01.  Independently withhold-
ing capacity may not make sense here for Energex because it is
losing the money it would otherwise make on the marginal gen-
erator, and is only gaining $.01 over the output of its other assets.
However, suppose that the next generator after Energex has a
fairly well known fuel cost and heat rate that makes its minimum
249 These plants, known as reliability-must-run (RMR) plants, were subject in Cal-
ifornia to contract-based prices if they were called upon for reliability purposes.
However, such contract prices were also subject to gaming: Should the RMR unit’s
owner suspect that the price for power would be lower in the market than the con-
tract price paid by the ISO, the owner could bid the unit so as not to be called on to
run in the market and instead receive the higher contract price.  For a discussion of
market power associated with RMR units, see  Frank A. Wolak & James Bushnell,
Reliability Must-Run Contracts for the California Electricity Market  (Mkt. Surveil-
lance Comm. of the Cal. ISO, Apr. 2, 1999), available at  http://faculty-gsb.stanford.
edu/wilson/archive/E542/classfiles/RMRreport.pdf (last visited June 5, 2004).
250 In other words, baseload generation with low marginal costs.  Note, however,
that combined cycle gas plants are often intermediate load generation, but nonethe-
less are oftentimes infra-marginal.
251 See infra  Figure 1.
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bid $5.00.  Here, Energex and Edisron may have large incentives
to collude to withhold their marginal plants.  Withholding could
mean bidding at $6.00.252  The previous discussion raises the issue
of unplanned outages.  Unprecedented levels of shutdowns oc-
curred during several months in 2001.253  Nearly 15,000 mega-
watts were off-line in April 2001.254  Average monthly electricity
prices jumped from $30/MWh in 2000 to $1,500/MWh in 2001.255
It is not clear whether or not the outages (both forced and
planned) were due to market power exercises or due to genuine
maintenance concerns.256  One of the reasons it is difficult to dis-
cern the difference is that the generators, due to capacity
shortages, were running at higher rates for longer periods of time
than has normally been the case.257  Additionally, in order to
keep other generators running longer, emissions control equip-
ment had to be installed.258  Moreover, California had asked the
operators of numerous critical plants to postpone routine mainte-
nance in the face of continued shortages.259  Thus, many plants
may have shut down in April to apply necessary maintenance
prior to the peak summer months.
The problem is akin to having a mechanic tell a mechanically
inept automobile owner that the alternator needs replacing.  The
owner may not recognize fraud, and even if the mechanic brings
out a broken alternator, the owner is never sure whether or not
the device belongs to the owner’s car or even whether it is indeed
252 Also, because of the operational characteristics of power plants, one could al-
ter the minimum run time of a power plant to ensure that when it is called upon, it is
called to run for a length of time in excess of the run time dictated by engineering
standards.  Thus, manipulation of baseload and intermediate load facilities could
also extract excess profits from the market.
253 Duane, supra  note 94, at 513 n.146.
254 Mitchell Landsberg, Plant Shutdowns Tied to Power Costs , L.A. TIMES, May
12, 2001, at A1.
255 Id .
256 There are, of course, some hints that at least some of the plant shutdowns were
for anticompetitive purposes.  Paul Joskow, California’s Electricity Crisis, 17 OX-
FORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 365, 381 (2001) (noting that amount of generating capacity
out of service was “unusually large”).  A paper cowritten by Joskow suggests that
the outages were due to incentives to withhold power. See  Paul Joskow & Edward
Kahn, Identifying the Exercise of Market Power: Refining the Estimates 3 (2001).
The CPUC appears to have amassed some evidence of physical withholding. See
Report on Wholesale Electric Generation Investigation (September 2002), available
at  http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/industry/electric/wholesale+generator+report.pdf.
257 Landsberg, supra  note 254.
258 Id.
259 Id.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 53  8-NOV-04 14:36
In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron 259
an alternator.  State regulatory officials may be able to monitor
such conduct by subpoena of maintenance records, but again
they are unlikely to recognize a broken alternator when they see
one.
There is some evidence, however, that generators may not be
savvy at hiding market power exercises.  The Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) was allegedly investigating whether AES Corporation
and Williams Energy Services conspired to withhold generation
from the California market.260  While it is unclear whether the
DOJ was investigating if the units were forced out for illegitimate
reasons or if they were kept off longer than normal for illegiti-
mate reasons, the thrust of the investigation is apparently
whether the units were withheld from service in order to enable
Williams to gain higher prices by selling power from other units it
owns.  The units pulled out of service supply power to utilities at
a relatively low price.261
The CPUC has also asserted that it found evidence of collusion
to withhold capacity through unplanned outages.262  Among the
allegations the CPUC head asserted was that during Stage 1




The electricity industry has traditionally been subject to anti-
trust law.  As stated above, electricity is typically subject to both
federal and state jurisdiction.  In general, FERC regulates the
wholesale aspects of the electricity industry265 while the states
regulate the retail components.  Deregulation has simultaneously
increased the tension between the federal and state regulators
while opening up a broader range of conduct to both segments.
It was at one time a common misperception in the industry
that because FERC must examine the antitrust implications of its
260 Peter Behr, Justice Probes AES’s Electricity Deal , WASH. POST, June 6, 2001,
at A11.
261 Id.
262 Rich Connell & Robert Lopez, PUC Chief Alleges Plot to Raise Prices , L.A.
TIMES, May 18, 2001, at A1.
263 A Stage 1 alert occurs when reserves drop below seven percent.
264 Connell & Lopez, supra  note 262.
265 But see  New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
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policies under the Federal Power Act,266 FERC regulation immu-
nizes industry conduct from scrutiny by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) and the DOJ.  As the U.S. Supreme Court stated
in Otter Tail Power v. United States , the legislative history of the
Federal Power Act indicates that:
Congress rejected a pervasive regulatory scheme for control-
ling the interstate distribution of power in favor of voluntary
commercial relationships.  When these relationships are gov-
erned in the first instance by business judgment and not regu-
latory coercion, courts must be hesitant to conclude that
Congress intended to override the fundamental national poli-
cies embodied in the antitrust laws.267
The antitrust laws have been applied to various types of con-
duct within the electric power industry.  Specifically, three key
provisions govern most conduct within that industry.  First, sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce.268  Conduct that
has been found to violate this section includes horizontal territo-
rial divisions,269 agreements not to compete,270 tying arrange-
266 See , e.g. , Gulf State Utilities Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 411 U.S. 747, 759-60
(1973).
267 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).
268
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby de-
clared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
269 See , e.g. , Gainesville Utilities Dep’t v. Florida Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d
292, 300 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining that an agreement to divide territories per se is
unlawful under § 1); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consol. Gas, Elec. Light &
Power Co., 184 F.2d 552, 567-68 (4th Cir. 1950) (explaining that an agreement al-
lowing one utility to control the wholesale energy prices of the second is per se
illegal under § 1); United States v. Florida Power Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶
73,637 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
270 See , e.g. , United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172
(W.D.N.Y. 1998).  RG&E offered to supply the University of Rochester electricity
at reduced rates if the University agreed “not to solicit or join with other customers
of RG&E to participate in any plan designed to provide them with electric power
and/or thermal energy from any source other than RG&E.” Id.  at 174.  After
RG&E lost its summary judgment motion, the case settled with a consent decree
forbidding RG&E from enforcing any agreement not to compete. See  United States
v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,200 (W.D.N.Y.
1998).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 55  8-NOV-04 14:36
In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron 261
ments,271 and mergers.272
Electric utilities are also subject to section 2 of the Sherman
Act, which prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization,
and conspiracies to monopolize.273  Numerous types of conduct
have been halted using this section, including denial of access to
transmission service,274 leveraging of monopoly power into other
markets,275 and price squeezes.276
Electric utility mergers and acquisitions are subject to section 7
of the Clayton Act, which prohibits stock or asset acquisitions
271 See  United States v. City of Stillwell, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,398 (E.D.
Okla. 1998) (final judgment).  The City of Stillwell required that customers purchase
electric power from the city if they wished to receive water and sewer service.  The
City held monopoly power in water and sewer service but not in the provision of
electric power.
272 See  City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256 (3rd Cir. 1998)
(affirming dismissal of city’s antitrust suit against two power companies due to a lack
of potential competition); see also  Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the
Potential Competition Doctrine  (working paper on file with author).
273
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
274 See  Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (describing a
refusal to sell power at wholesale or wheel power to former retail customer munici-
palities); Florida Mun. Power Agency v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 614
(11th Cir. 1995); cf.  City of Anaheim v. S. California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373 (9th
Cir. 1992) (explaining that the utility had legitimate business justification for deny-
ing transmission service in that providing such service would cause utility to forego
use of its own transmission lines and thereby increase the utility’s own costs); City of
Vernon v. S. California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing a re-
fusal to enter into an operating agreement to integrate city’s power purchases into
the transmission system).
275 See  Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 1260 (3rd
Cir. 1994) (offering of reduced electric rates for purchases of homes electrically
heated); cf.  Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 145 F.3d 1258
(11th Cir. 1998) (leveraging did not exist where utility did not sell products related
to plaintiff’s market).
276 See  City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982) (re-
jecting filed rate doctrine as a defense); City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
465 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff’d in part and vacated in part , 616 F.2d 976
(7th Cir. 1980) (finding illegal price squeeze by utility that precluded its wholesale
customers from competing with utility for retail customers); Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976); Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co.,
202 F.3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000); cf . Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17
(1st Cir. 1990).
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that “tend to lessen competition” or that tend to “create a mo-
nopoly.”277  Numerous mergers have been challenged, some
leading to the requirement that the merging utilities divest assets
in order for the transaction to go forward.278
A. Acquisition of Strategic Generation Prior to
Commencement of Competition
One possible avenue that perhaps would have caused fewer
exercises of market power in the deregulated electricity market is
the elimination of the incentive and ability, ex ante , for genera-
tors to exercise market power.  While regulatory mechanisms
may offer security ex post  by mitigating the exercise of market
power and while antitrust may remedy harms ex post  as well, ex
ante  mechanisms would ensure that such exercises never took
place.
In California, every generator in most hours had the ability to
exercise market power.  This is because, as explained above, in
most hours California was short on capacity.  During such times,
any withholding strategy would cause the clearing price to rise
dramatically.  However, such ability without an incentive means
very little.  Sadly, many generation owners in California had the
incentive to increase prices within California due to the location
of the plants they owned on the bid curve.
There were two reasons why the exercise of market power by
generation owners was not foreseeable, and, even if foreseeable,
non-resolvable under the antitrust laws.  First, the pre-competi-
tion acquisition of generation passed muster under the Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines promulgated by the DOJ and FTC (and
277 Section 7 reads, in part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of an-
other person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting com-
merce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
278 See , e.g. , United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000).  A
transaction between Consolidated Edison and Orange & Rockland Utilities was
cleared after the parties divested certain assets. See  Press Release, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Divestitures Resolve Department of Justice Investigation of New York Util-
ity Merger (July 2, 1999), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/
1999/2550.htm.
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followed to some degree by FERC).  Second, there was no antici-
pation that the acquisitions would enable the generation owners
to exercise something akin to vertical market power by using dis-
parate generation resources to benefit other units in the genera-
tion owner’s fleet.
To see why the purchase of power plants failed to attract anti-
trust scrutiny, consider the following hypothetical: California
Utility Corp. (CUC) has ten generation assets up for sale, five
base load units and five peaking facilities.  Suppose that in the
first sale, CUC sold one base load facility and one peaking facil-
ity to Gulf of Texas Energy (GOTE), conferring upon GOTE a
20% market share based upon capacity of its baseload plant and
a 1% market share based upon the capacity of its peaking plant.
The acquisition of the two units will survive antitrust scrutiny: the
effect of the transaction is deconcentrating (the 21% market
share gained by GOTE is substantially less than the 100% mar-
ket share that CUC controlled).  Thus, the transaction is unlikely
to be challenged by antitrust enforcers.
Even if the purchases of generation were sequential, they are
unlikely to be challenged.  Suppose that GOTE first purchased a
plant conferring upon it a 20% market share in the California
market.  It then purchased in a subsequent auction a peaking fa-
cility, increasing its market share by 1%.  Under the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines,279 there would be no challenge, because the
market share is sufficiently low in the relevant market and the
transaction does not dramatically increase it.  Again, the overall
transaction’s effect would appear deconcentrating because of the
substantial market share that the utility held over pre-sale
capacity.
However, such a purchase could very well have anticompeti-
tive effects.  For example, suppose that GOTE’s peaking unit is
the unit whose bid is the last selected in the PX most hours.  As-
sume further that demand is perfectly inelastic.  GOTE may
know that its unit is typically called upon under these weather
conditions.  Thus, GOTE may bid that unit higher (or have an
“accident”) that causes the plant to be either physically or eco-
nomically withheld.  As a result, the next highest-cost plant is se-
lected, causing prices in the market to increase.  As a result,
279 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines § 1.1, reprinted in JOHN J. FLYNN ET AL., ANTITRUST: STAT-
UTES, TREATIES, REGULATIONS, GUIDELINES, AND POLICIES 121-22 (2001).
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GOTE’s baseload unit will have conferred upon it rents accrued
due to GOTE’s exercise of market power over its peaking unit.
This phenomenon is depicted in Figure 2 at the end of this Ar-
ticle.  In Figure 2, GOTE withholds its marginal generation unit,
causing the next-lowest priced unit to come on-line, lifting the
clearing price paid to all units in the market.  Absent perfect mit-
igation measures, GOTE continues to have an incentive to en-
gage in this activity so long as it owns a diversity of assets and is
assured that its unit will not be replaced by a unit of equal price.
During the period prior to launching of the California “der-
egulated” market, a flurry of generation sales were approved by
the FERC.  In each instance, FERC applied its market power
test from its merger policy statement.280  Also in each instance,
FERC approved the transaction because there was no indication
of market power, given that no generator held more than 20 per-
cent of the assets (by design of the CPUC)281 and that each trans-
action had a deconcentrating effect on the market.282  Moreover,
the sales were necessary in order for generation to be separated
from transmission to ensure that vertical market power would
not take place.  Finally, the sales were necessary in order for Cal-
ifornia’s energy market to commence, something that FERC
wished to see take place.  California supported the power plant
buyers’ requests to supply power at market-based rates.
Market power could potentially be exercised even in instances
where the generation company does not own the marginal unit
that sets the market clearing price.  Suppose, for example, that
280 Order No. 592, Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under
the Federal Power Act; Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595, (1996), on recons .,
Order No. 592-A, 79 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,321 (1997).  FERC has recently modified its mar-
ket power test.  See FERC, Order on Rehearing and Modifying Interim Generation
Market Power Analysis and Mitigation Policy (issued April 14, 2004).  The new mar-
ket power tests use a series of screens to test for market power, raising the risk that,
as with prior FERC screens, market power might go undetected by the screens.
281 Duane, supra  note 94, at 515.
282 The notion that rudimentary market power concentration measures are inef-
fective determinants of the existence of market power in energy markets is not new.
See , e.g. , Robert J. Michaels, Market Power in Electric Utility Mergers: Access, En-
ergy, and the Guidelines , 17 ENERGY L.J. 401, 419 (1996) (“Measures of concentra-
tion become particularly suspect when analyzing efficient plants because they will
depend on market prices of the future that are intrinsically unknowable today.”);
Borenstein & Bushnell, supra  note 108, at 49 (“The ability of firms with . . . modest
market shares to exercise market power is greater [in electricity] than in most
[other] markets.  That is why concentration measures that are widely used to diag-
nose the potential for market power are not very informative when applied to elec-
tricity markets.”).
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the purchaser of baseload generation owns no marginal genera-
tion, but owns a gas pipeline that is the sole supplier of gas to the
unit setting the clearing price during most hours.283  The pipeline
owner will possess an incentive and ability to exercise market
power without ownership of significant generation resources by
increasing the cost of fuel to the marginal unit.  Such a scenario is
impervious to FERC’s market power screen.284
In applying the superficial market power screen in the merger
policy statement, FERC and California ignored potential supply
and demand conditions, vertical issues associated with gas own-
ership, and bid-curve strategies such as the ones outlined
above.285  Moreover, the DOJ was unable to challenge these
transactions because they were on their face procompetitive, and
projections of how the markets might function at some point in
the distant future would prove too tenuous a case to survive
dismissal.
In bringing such a case, the DOJ would also face the difficulty
of defining relevant markets in a way meaningful in antitrust law.
There would be two possibilities.  First, the relevant market
might be the market as defined by the CPUC—i.e., the day-
ahead market and the hour-ahead market.  The analysis under
this approach would mimic that of FERC’s merger policy state-
ment.  Since no generator owned more than 20% of the market’s
capacity, a complaint based upon the accumulation of a 20%
market share (with a pre-acquisition share of 0%!) would be un-
likely to survive a motion to dismiss.
Another option would have been to allege a relevant market
along the following lines: the relevant market is the capacity pro-
vided by the marginal generation unit during the daytime hours
during the months of June through August, two years from now,
had that unit bid normally but for an exercise of market power.
The allegation appears tautological—as the relevant market is in
fact the generation unit.
Intuitively, however, the latter approach makes sense.  During
hours in which demand intersects supply at the marginal unit to
283 See  Navarro & Shames, supra  note 155, at 46 (explaining that there can be no
free market in electricity if the gas pipeline system is plagued by market power).
284 See , e.g. , United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000)
(describing a consent decree discussing ability of gas provider to raise prices for gas
in California market and thus increase profits on provider’s low cost electric genera-
tion within that state).
285 It is unclear yet whether FERC’s new screens will prove Santayana right.
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be owned by the acquiring firm and where the supply curve is
particularly steep, there is no substitute for that generation.
Thus, it would indeed be the case that the generation unit would
have some degree of market power.  If this were the only unit
owned by the acquiring company, the case would fall short be-
cause the generator would lack an incentive to withhold.  How-
ever, where the acquiring company owns multiple units,
including baseload, the incentive is present in hours where its
peaking facility is on the margin to withhold.
However, to a presiding judge, the approach will seem con-
trived, and the DOJ likely could never bring such a case.  Plus,
the fewer the hours the unit is on the margin, the less likely the
case will be a winner.  Moreover, the evidence presented in such
a case will be speculative: forecasted demand projected several
years out with a supply curve based upon marginal cost.
In sum, the antitrust laws cannot prevent the acquisition of
generation sufficient to exercise market power where there is no
straightforward horizontal concentration.  Thus, market rules
must prevent the acquisition of a combination of generation units
that give rise to the incentive and ability to exercise market
power.
B. Allegations Against Enron
In memoranda prepared by Enron’s attorneys in response to
FERC staff’s investigation of the California power crisis, Enron’s
various trading strategies were detailed.  These strategies have
been the focus of much outrage.  Senators from California, for
example, publicly called for an antitrust investigation of Enron
and other energy traders in the California energy market.286
Enron allegedly used numerous strategies to manipulate mar-
ket prices in California.  What follows is a brief description of
each strategy and a discussion of whether that conduct violated
the antitrust laws.
1. Load Shift
Enron’s load shift strategy involved the receipt of interzonal
286 See  Nancy Rivera Brooks et al., Memo Shows Enron Role in Hiking Prices ,
L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at A1 (quoting Sen. Boxer as stating that the documents
“confirm what I’ve been saying for months, that Enron manipulated the California
energy market and needs to be held accountable.  It is high time we see some indict-
ments handed down in this case,” and calling for an antitrust investigation.).
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congestion payments287 by submitting artificial schedules.  Enron
would, for example, artificially create congestion in California’s
southern zone by over-scheduling in the southern zone and
under-scheduling by a corresponding amount in the northern
zone.288  By creating this imbalance, Enron forced the ISO to
find additional transmission capacity (flowing from north to
south).  Load was thus shifted from north to south, and Enron
was paid congestion rents, because it owned 62% of the Firm
Transmission Rights (FTRs)289 for north-south transmission on
Path 26.290  This created an incentive for Enron to shift load in
order to collect congestion rents.  According to FERC, Enron re-
ceived the vast majority of its payments during July and August
of 2000.291  These payments totaled approximately $33 million
for those two months.292
However, while Enron was able to increase the amount and
duration of congestion, it was unsuccessful in its attempts to in-
crease the price it was paid for congestion.  This is because the
two largest load-serving entities (LSEs), Pacific Gas & Electric
and Southern California Edison, often set the price for conges-
tion relief.293  LSEs would bid to decrease or increase their load
in this congestion market.  If load were required to be shed or
increased, bids would be accepted based upon stacked bid sub-
missions from all LSEs.  For the vast majority of hours in the
California market, Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern Califor-
nia Edison set the price for congestion relief (ranging from 1500
megawatts to 4000 megawatts).294  Thus, while Enron could in-
crease the volume of congestion, it could not increase the clear-
ing price paid for congestion relief because in most hours the
major utilities set the price for congestion relief.295  Nor could
Enron’s strategy affect real-time prices, for those were deter-
287 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Initial Report on Company-Specific
Separate Proceedings and Generic Reevaluations; Published Natural Gas Price
Data; and Enron Trading Strategies: Fact-Finding Investigation of Potential Manipu-
lation of Electric and Natural Gas Prices, Docket No. PA02-2-000, at 84 (2002),
available at  http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-rep-elec.asp (last visited June 5, 2004)
[hereinafter Enron Report].
288 Id.  at 85.
289 Id.
290 Id.  at 85-86.  Enron paid $3.6 million for these FTRs. Id.  at 85.




295 See  Final Report, supra  note 7, at VI-13, VI-14 (noting that while “Enron was
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mined only after corrections had been made to Enron’s load
forecasts.
The load shift strategy pursued by Enron appears to be largely
a phenomenon of California’s quirky regulation.  Specifically, be-
cause Enron was not required to internalize the costs of conges-
tion that Enron by itself created, Enron could receive revenues
by causing more congestion in the day-ahead market and be paid
to relieve congestion in real time.296
The strategy is impossible to alleviate via antitrust means.
While the FTRs received by Enron were a substantial portion of
the FTRs on Path 26,297 Enron did not use its FTRs in any mo-
nopolistic fashion.  Rather, any generation plant had the poten-
tial of creating greater congestion (and benefiting Enron’s
bottom line through congestion payments) without bearing any
market power.  And, because the strategy is typically unilateral,
it is unlikely to be assailable under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
2. Exports of California Power and Ricochet
Enron also engaged in strategies called “exports of California
Power” and “Ricochet.”298  Because the two strategies are simi-
lar, they will both be discussed here.  The exports of California
power strategy involved buying energy at the PX for export
outside of California.  This strategy was implemented during the
time period in which California wholesale prices remained
capped, while the rest of the WECC faced uncapped wholesale
rates.  In order to obtain higher wholesale prices outside of the
price cap (and to meet increased demand in the western states),
Enron exported power that it purchased in the PX at a capped
price at a time when California desperately needed imports.299
The result was an increase in the real-time costs of power for the
ISO seeking imports, and an assurance that the day-ahead price
would remain at capped price levels.
The Ricochet (a.k.a. “megawatt laundering” and “round trip
generally not able to move the cost of congestion,” it nontheless added to the “con-
fusion” of the market).
296 This strategy could not take place in energy markets in other regions of the
country. See  FERC SMD NOPR, supra  note 79, at 55,582, ¶ 4.
297 See  Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 85-86.
298 Id . at 88, 92.
299 FERC staff has noted that Enron is unlikely to have been the only firm engag-
ing in this strategy.  California exports were substantially greater during the summer
of 2000 than in previous years—between 40% and 230%. Id.  at 90.
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trading”) trading strategy involved purchasing power from the
California day-ahead market and exporting it to a second entity
outside of the state.300  The energy was then resold to the Califor-
nia ISO in the real-time market or an out-of-market sale.301  To
engage in this strategy, transmission resources and generation re-
sources are necessary.302  Because Enron did not own transmis-
sion in California, Enron used the transmission systems303 of the
City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP),
the Transmission Agency of Northern California (TANC),
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), its own public utility
affiliate, Portland General Electric (PGE), and others.304
As with exports of California power, this strategy was em-
ployed when the FERC price cap only governed California’s
real-time market and not the WECC.  California typically im-
ported power from outside of California in the real-time market
and also from “out of market.”  Thus, Ricochet was used to avoid
regulation of wholesale prices.
The goal of these strategies was to equilibrate the uncapped
wholesale prices faced by the WECC (except California) with the
capped prices being paid in the California market ($250/MWh).
The strategies worked because when the ISO needed power from
outside the state, the ISO procured that power at uncapped rates.
Thus, as California and the WECC were scrambling to find
power, it was unsurprising that California would be the losing
party in this competition for power.  The strategies were never
prohibited under California’s market rules.
While these strategies contributed to scarcity within California,
they did so only to the extent that California was unwilling to
300 Final Report, supra  note 7, at VI-17.
301 Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 92.
302 Id.  at 94.
303 Other market participants also appear to have engaged in this strategy. See
Final Report, supra  note 7, at VI-18, VI-19.
304 Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 93.  The use of its public utility affiliate raises
interesting antitrust issues.  Typically Section 1 Sherman Act cases against related
companies would be barred under the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.  Specifi-
cally, related companies may not be capable of conspiring with one another because
they have a “complete unity of interest . . . [such that] there is no sudden joining of
economic resources that had previously served different interests.”  Copperweld
Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).  However, one could poten-
tially assert that a combination of resources that regulation had mandated remain
separate could in fact violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. See  Darren Bush, Con-
spiracies of One: When Violation of FERC’s Code of Conduct Rules Constitutes a
Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade  (working paper on file with authors).
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compete with the rest of the WECC for procurement of power.
Indeed, California exacerbated the situation with the help of
FERC by continually asking and receiving lower price caps.  In
July 2000, California asked FERC to establish a $750/MWh price
cap.  In August 2000, California asked FERC to lower the price
cap to $500/MWh.  In September 2000, California asked FERC
to lower the price cap to $250/MWh.  And in November 2000,
California ISO admitted that the flat price caps were a failure
when the state faced a lack of imports, and asked FERC to void
the $250/MWh price cap.  In December 2000, FERC issued a
price cap of $150/MWh plus actual variable costs for fuel and
emissions.305
No antitrust violation was involved in this strategy, absent evi-
dence that Enron had coordinated its behavior with others.  En-
ron chose to charge a high price for the power it supplied.  A
long line of antitrust cases allows even monopolists to charge
whatever price they wish for their products, absent some other
conduct.306  The increase in prices within California was not the
result of some withholding strategy or otherwise anticompetitive
conduct, but due to the very nature of California’s regulation.
By not recognizing that the WECC should be a single ISO due to
the high level of dependency among the western states, Califor-
nia and federal regulators set up a barrier that created incentives
to export power, all the while allowing such export.
3. Fat Boy (Inc-ing of Load)
“Fat Boy” was a mechanism by which a scheduling coordina-
tor307 could artificially increase (“inc”) load on the schedule it
305 See  Bolton, supra  note 218.
306 See, e.g ., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 n.12 (2d
Cir. 1979).
Nor is a lawful monopolist ordinarily precluded from charging as high a
price for its product as the market will accept.  True, this is a use of eco-
nomic power; indeed, the differential between price and marginal cost is
used as an indication of the degree of monopoly power; . . . but high prices,
far from damaging competition, invite new competitors into the monopo-
lized market.
307 Enron was a scheduling coordinator because it served some load in California.
Scheduling coordinators (SCs) submit balanced schedules and provide settlement-
ready meter data to the ISO.  The strategy here should be contrasted with anticom-
petitive strategies that typically involve security coordinators.  For example, security
coordinators might use their control over transmission lines to benefit their affiliate
generation.  In the Midwest, for example, security coordinators might call for the
unloading of a line through transmission loading relief procedures in ways that
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submitted to the California ISO.  Under California rules, all
schedules submitted by a scheduling coordinator would have to
be balanced, i.e., supply would have to equal demand.308  The
scheduling coordinator could meet demand by running genera-
tion it scheduled and/or by purchasing power on the market.  En-
ron’s overestimation of load meant that Enron would schedule
additional generation that was not meeting demand.  Thus, En-
ron guaranteed itself any energy payment by overscheduling
load.309
Oddly enough, the strategy was designed to counter the mo-
nopsony strategies developed by the three major California
LSEs.  During the time this conduct was taking place, the real-
time market price was capped, whereas the day-ahead market
was not.310  Thus, to minimize costs, the utilities would only
purchase power on the day-ahead market at prices that were be-
low the real-time cap.311
The utilities’ strategy created enormous scheduling problems
for the ISO.  The real-time market was meant to be a balancing
market serving less than five percent of the supply needed to bal-
ance supply and demand.312  By transforming this balancing mar-
ket into a full-scale commodity market, the utilities caused severe
reliability problems for the ISO.  Moreover, the strategy of the
utilities drove the California PX price below efficient levels.
Enron’s Fat Boy strategy actually helped the ISO balance load,
and the ISO to some degree helped Enron engage in the Fat Boy
trading strategy.313  The Fat Boy strategy alleviated the under-
scheduling problem by supplying the ISO with “phantom” load—
scheduling of load to artificial delivery points.  The ISO actually
helped Enron in this strategy to ensure that the ISO did not have
to scramble for power on a market that was designed to supply
no more than twenty percent of California’s energy needs.
The Fat Boy trading strategy did not constitute a violation of
the antitrust laws.  The strategy, while involving deception and a
might benefit affiliate generation. See  Rao & Tabors, supra  note 68, at 21 (noting
that vertically integrated transmission providers may foreclose generators from com-
peting with affiliate generation via use of their transmission systems).
308 Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 94.
309 Id.
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contortion of market rules, is just that—a contortion of market
rules.  Moreover, the strategy involved substantial risk for Enron
and is more akin to arbitrage than a market power exercise.  En-
ron was essentially wagering that more load would need to be
served than the ISO was anticipating.314  If Enron was correct in
its guess, then it would be paid a higher price than it would re-
ceive in the day-ahead market.315  If Enron was wrong, it would
receive a lower price or perhaps nothing.  Enron was unable to
manipulate these prices or exclude other generation from these
markets.
There is, however, some degree of concerted action between
the ISO and Enron, akin to a vertical restraint of trade subject to
the rule of reason.  The justification for the collusion, of course,
is system reliability in the wake of potential brownouts and enor-
mous scheduling problems.  Moreover, the strategy was a defense
against market power exercised by the utilities.  Consumers suf-
fered no injury from this strategy—in fact, their lot may have
been improved given that they were less likely to suffer
brownouts.
4. Non-Firm Export, Death Star, Wheel Out, and Other
Counterflow Strategies
Enron engaged in several trading strategies designed to enable
Enron to be paid for counterflow.316  Specifically, Enron took ad-
vantage of flaws in California’s congestion management software
to receive payment for “reducing congestion” without ever hav-
ing to move a single megawatt.317  While they varied to some de-
gree by name and pattern, the ultimate goal of the strategy was
always the receipt of this payment for reducing congestion.  In
many instances, the strategies involved multiple parties.
“Death Star” referred to the strategy of scheduling energy in
the opposite direction of a congestion point, providing counter-
flow.  However, no energy was ever moved, because the counter-
flow was typically provided against another Enron transaction
moving in the direction of the congestion.  The moves cancelled
314 This was a safe bet given the exercises of monopsony power taking place by
the utilities.
315 Given California’s market conditions, Enron was engaging in a relatively safe
bet.
316 See supra  note 249 and accompanying text for an explanation of counterflow.
317 Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 96.
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each other out, except that Enron received a congestion
payment.
“Wheel Out” referred to the practice of scheduling the moving
of power in the direction of congestion on a fully constrained
intertie, knowing full well that the transaction would be cut and
Enron would receive a congestion payment.318  Once again, no
actual energy need be moved to engage in this strategy.
“Non-Firm Export” refers to the strategy of receiving a con-
gestion payment for counterflow by scheduling non-firm energy
from a point in California to a control area outside the state, and
then cutting the transaction once the congestion payment is
received.319
The existence of the counterflow strategies largely arose from
poor congestion-management software design and faulty market
rules, not from exercises of market power.  Specifically, Enron
could schedule power to flow across lines that were full or out of
service and receive congestion payments for backing off the
power.  Moreover, the market rules allowed such behavior to
flourish on a first-mover basis.  Because the transmission lines in
question were typically always constrained, the first to provide
phantom counterflow would receive the payment.  Thus, Enron
is blamed here for being the quickest to exploit the weakness in
the market rules and congestion software, whereas others would
have done so as well.320
FERC claims that this strategy would not be practicable under
FERC’s SMD NOPR or under more efficiently designed systems
such as PJM and the New York Independent System Operator
(NYISO).321  A properly functioning market would have made
this strategy unprofitable because the entity creating the conges-
tion would be required to pay for it.  However, under Califor-
nia’s rules, the entity creating the congestion was never required
to pay for the congestion it created.  Instead, it would be paid to
alleviate it.
318 Hilariously, in many instances, the tie was never in service.  Ross Perot’s com-
pany, Perot Systems, provided this software, and it is these strategies that are the
subject of discussion with respect to Perot’s involvement in the California crisis. See
California State Senator Accuses Perot Systems and Three California Municipal Utili-
ties of Market Corruption , FOSTER ELEC. REP., June 12, 2002, at 9.
319 Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 96.  California forbade this practice in Au-
gust 2000. Id . at 97.
320 Id.  at 98.
321 FERC SMD NOPR, supra  note 79, at Appendix E.
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5. Get Shorty
The “Get Shorty” trading strategy was designed to take advan-
tage of flaws in the ancillary services market.  Enron would bid to
provide ancillary services in the California PX’s day-ahead mar-
ket and then cover in the real-time market.  This strategy permit-
ted Enron to sell ancillary services at a high price and purchase
them at a low price.  Such arbitrage was permitted by the ISO,
except that Enron submitted false information as to the origin of
its ancillary service coverage.322  Using this strategy, Enron
sought to arbitrage the day-ahead ancillary services market with
the real-time market.  Specifically, Enron would sell ancillary ser-
vices in the day-ahead market and purchase them in the real-time
market, making money off the spread.
There are two grievances with this strategy, neither of which
are antitrust related.  First, Enron, by committing to sell ancillary
services in the day-ahead market, submitted false information to
the ISO indicating from which facilities ancillary services would
be provided.323  The purpose, of course, was to ensure system re-
liability by giving the ISO notice as to which facilities would be
available to provide ancillary services.  Had the ISO called upon
Enron to provide such ancillary services, the ISO would have
been up a congested path without counterflow.
FERC’s SMD NOPR324 suggested that it would allow for vir-
tual bidding, which would allow convergence of day-ahead mar-
ket and hour-ahead market prices.  It would allow traders to
submit bids to provide ancillary services not backed by physical
units if they are so identified.  Thus, FERC would establish a
two-tier ancillary services market, one in which ancillary services
are backed by physical assets and one in which ancillary services
are simply financial trades.
In sum, Enron’s strategy did nothing to impact the California
crisis, although it did attempt to make the day-ahead market and
hour-ahead ancillary services markets converge.  The bad con-
322 Enron sought to profit from Get Shorty by getting paid for a firm ancillary
service even though it had not incurred the costs to line up resources to provide the
service.  If called upon by the ISO, Enron’s strategy was to go to the real-time mar-
ket to fulfill its obligation.  Under the ISO rules, Enron was required to line up
resources (and thus to have incurred costs) prior to bidding in the day-ahead mar-
ket.  In short, Enron used the physical ancillary services market as a financial mar-
ket.  Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 98.
323 Id.  at 99.
324 See  FERC SMD NOPR, supra  note 79.
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duct was misinformation, but no exercise of market power viola-
tive of antitrust laws occurred here.
6. Selling Non-Firm Energy as Firm Energy
Enron also sold low-quality product as high-quality product,
thereby making profit on the margin.  Specifically, Enron would
purchase non-firm energy outside of California and sell it into
California as firm energy.  Firm energy is a superior product to
non-firm energy because it is backed by reserve generation.  This
strategy had the effect of bringing more non-firm power into Cal-
ifornia with no impact on PX prices.325
Enron created this strategy in order to be paid for ancillary
services.  Under California’s regime, if the energy were labeled
as firm, Enron would receive an ancillary service payment.  Non-
firm energy could not receive such a payment.326
Again, the problem with this strategy is not that it affects
prices in California’s markets (it does not), but rather that it vio-
lates NERC’s interchange rules and compromises system reliabil-
ity in California.327
While it may be true that Enron’s strategies did violate NERC
rules, the risk of a system meltdown due to Enron’s strategies
was de minimis.328  Insofar as a risk existed, it was largely associ-
ated with transporting power from outside of California to inside
the state.  As FERC recognized in its SMD NOPR, whether the
ancillary services are backed by capacity from individual units is
immaterial so long as the total capacity available is able to meet
demand (and flow across the appropriate interties).  Thus,
FERC’s SMD NOPR proposes that all transmission services be
provided on network basis, “so there would be no difference in
the ancillary service requirements . . . [and] [t]hus . . . no reason
for this strategy.”329
7. Evidence of Collusion
FERC’s Enron Report also outlines evidence of concerted ac-
tion among Enron and some of its competitors designed to influ-
325 Id.  at 55,582.
326 Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 100.
327 See  John Falk, Enron’s Strategies in California and the Benefits of Arbitrage  13-
14, (NERA, Working Paper, 2002) (on file with authors).
328 Id.
329 FERC SMD NOPR, supra  note 79, at Appendix E.
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ence prices in the California energy market.  A summary of the
evidence presented in the FERC report follows.330
The first allegation suggests concerted action between Enron
and El Paso Electric.  According to FERC, El Paso’s trading
desk was manned with Enron staff seventy-five percent of the
time.331  A letter from Enron to three senior El Paso executives
allegedly discusses how the two companies “had taken advantage
of the unseasonably hot weather and unit outages that occurred
in the West during a single month in the summer of 2000” and led
El Paso to receive “revenues in excess of $7 million from that
month’s joint dealings between El Paso Electric and Enron.”332
One of the senior executives wrote back and suggested that the
results were a “great illustration of what is possible when
teamwork, knowledge, initiative and accountability all come
together.”333
FERC staff suggested that the joint dealings may have ad-
versely affected energy prices in the West.  However, as evidence
of price manipulation, they only pointed to “a high level of reve-
nues” for which they could not account.334  The staff recognized,
however, that such evidence does not implicate improper con-
duct, but does suggest that further investigation is necessary.  The
agreements that FERC staff referred to are operating agree-
ments between Enron and El Paso.  In those agreements, known
as tolling agreements, Enron performed management services
and controlled the operations of some of El Paso’s plants.335
Another allegation against Enron is that it violated FERC’s
code of conduct by engaging in barred affiliate transactions.336
Specifically, certain types of transactions are barred absent
FERC approval, including the sale of energy by an unregulated
affiliate with market-based rate authority to a regulated affiliate
with captive customers.337  Also, information flowing between
the regulated and unregulated affiliates must be disclosed to the
public.338  Moreover, entities with both a merchant function and
330 Enron Report, supra  note 287, at 25-31.
331 Id.  at 26.
332 Id.
333 Id.  at 26.
334 Id.  at 27.
335 There are also allegations that El Paso gave preferential treatment to its gener-
ating facilties over its transmission lines in contravention to FERC Order 888. Id .
336 Id.  at 29.
337 Id.
338 Id.
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a transmission function must act independently of one another.
The FERC staff, in its Enron report, noted communication be-
tween Enron and PGE that may have violated code-of-conduct
restrictions.
One way around the code-of-conduct regulations was to en-
gage in affiliate transactions through intermediaries.  The FERC
staff alleged that Enron did precisely this using PGE.  The use of
the intermediary was designed to circumvent affiliate rules.
Thus far, the allegations against Enron have failed to demon-
strate concerted action in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act or provide evidence of Enron’s ability to raise prices or ex-
clude competition.  Rather, the conduct described thus far ap-
pears at best to be regulatory evasion, at worst fraud.  None of
the charges would support an antitrust claim.
However, where two competitors agree to restrain trade and
engage in concerted action to do so, the antitrust laws clearly
apply.  The strength of the allegations depends upon what further
evidence FERC might uncover in its investigation.
Several possibilities exist for antitrust action against Enron and
El Paso in this regard involving section 1 of the Sherman Act.339
At worst, the conversations between El Paso and Enron might be
evidence of per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Specifically, Enron and El Paso might have conspired to fix
prices and withhold generation in order to increase revenues for
both companies.  One could potentially infer such conduct from
the conversations discussed above.  However, more evidence
would be necessary for a successful prosecution under that
theory.
C. Other Conduct Potentially Violating the Antitrust Laws
1. Bidding High (Economic Withholding)
Some have asserted that the mere act of bidding high consti-
tutes an exercise of market power that violates the antitrust laws.
Specifically, the act of bidding a marginal generation unit above
cost in an effort to withhold it from the market is monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.340
There are difficulties with this assertion, both pragmatically
and with respect to antitrust policy.  With respect to the latter,
339 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
340 Id . § 2.
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charging a high price has never, by itself, been sufficient to sus-
tain a monopolization claim.  Monopolization means the use of
monopoly power to unlawfully maintain or extend a monopoly,
but does not include the exercise of monopoly power legitimately
obtained.341  Artificially inflating prices falls into this latter cate-
gory of conduct.  As the Second Circuit stated:
Excessive prices, maintained through exercise of a monopo-
list’s control of the market, constituted one of the primary
evils that the Sherman Act was intended to correct . . . . Where
a monopolist has acquired or maintained its power by an-
ticompetitive conduct, therefore, a direct purchaser may re-
cover the overcharge caused by the violation of § 2 . . . . But
unless the monopoly has bolstered its power by wrongful ac-
tions, it will not be required to pay damages merely because its
prices may later be found excessive.  Setting a high price may
be a use of monopoly power, but it is not in itself anticompeti-
tive.  Indeed, although a monopolist may be expected to
charge a somewhat higher price than would prevail in a com-
petitive market, there is probably no better way for it to guar-
antee that its dominance will be challenged than by greedily
extracting the highest price it can.342
Thus, merely bidding high, a practice undertaken by essentially
all the generation companies with marginal generation units in
California, is insufficient to sustain an antitrust claim.  However,
bidding high has serious repercussions for market performance,
especially in times of capacity shortage.
Numerous mechanisms might protect against the exercise of
market power in this manner.343  However, no antitrust mecha-
nism can protect against this particular exercise of market power.
2. Withholding of Capacity Through Plant Outages
(Physical Withholding)
Physical withholding achieves the same result as economic
withholding within an energy market.  The generator who raises
prices or takes its plant off-line causes the ISO to substitute more
341 A section 2 monopolization violation requires proof of two elements: “(1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a con-
sequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident .”  United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (emphasis added).
342 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979);
Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 283-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a
price increase is an insufficient basis for a monopolization claim); see also  Alaska
Airlines v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1991).
343 See infra  Section V.
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expensive generation for that unit.  This increases the price paid
to all infra-marginal generation assets, including the withholder’s
infra-marginal generation.  In other words, the generation owner
is sacrificing profits on its marginal generation unit to benefit in-
fra-marginal generation.  The difficulty in painting this story as a
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is that both physical
and economic withholding are perfectly rational strategies for
joint profit maximization of the firm’s different generation units.
Thus, antitrust law will not cure the price increase caused by
physical or economic withholding, unless some concerted action
was required between generation owners that would violate sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.  The conduct discussed here, however,
does not exclude rivals or enhance monopoly power.  Thus, it
cannot be said to violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.
If any distinction is to be made, it is a regulatory distinction.
Physical withholding for anticompetitive reasons is more difficult
to detect than economic withholding.  While the amount of ca-
pacity off-line due to shutdowns was unprecedented in 2004,
there may be various causes for the increase in shutdowns.  The
shutdowns may have been due to the exercise of market power.
Most generators owned infra-marginal and marginal assets.
However, the shutdowns may have been due to the long, hot
summer in which plants were kept on-line to meet demand, de-
ferring maintenance until the fall.  Thus, whether the abnormal
amount of generation off-line was an intentional exercise of mar-
ket power or a legitimate attempt to repair damaged plants is
unclear.  Regardless, average monthly electricity prices year to
year grew from $30 MW/hr to $1500 MW/hr during that same
time period.
However, as discussed above, if the physical or economic with-
holding requires more than one firm to enact, then the firms
might have violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.  One possible
example of such an agreement arises in the context of the DOJ’s
investigation of AES and Williams.  The agreement alleged by
the DOJ centered upon AES’s Alamitos and Huntington Beach
plants.344  The agreement, commonly known as a tolling agree-
ment, was that AES would take Williams’ gas and generate elec-
tricity, which it would then sell back to Williams at a given price.
The DOJ is apparently investigating whether Williams had asked
that AES keep the generation units off-line in an effort to affect
344 Behr, supra  note 260.
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energy clearing prices in California in April and May of 2000.
This allowed Williams to sell power from its other assets at
higher prices.  If this conduct is proven, it may be a per se viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In short, the unilateral physical withholding of power from
generation units is not a cognizable claim under the antitrust
laws.  Thus, regulation must be the method used to ensure that




Despite the peculiarities of the California market, regulatory
mechanisms do not necessarily instill incentives upon market
participants to engage in acts that may ultimately damage the
market.  And while furor erupted about the unworkability of
markets in the context of California, the relative successes of
markets in PJM, New York, and New England have gone largely
ignored.
In reaction to the California situation, FERC issued its SMD
NOPR.345  FERC’s goal was to create seamless markets across
ISOs.  Currently, all of the ISOs have different rules,346 causing
the importation of energy across ISOs to be difficult.  FERC also
sought to correct market formation errors evident in California’s
market design by ensuring that markets developed in the future
would adhere to certain principles designed to encourage the
proper functioning of these markets.
There are certain concepts central to FERC’s SMD NOPR.
First, load-serving entities would be required to meet resource
adequacy requirements.347  Spot-market purchases of energy, of
course, would still be available to meet marginal generation
needs.  In addition, ISOs would still operate ancillary service
markets in conjunction with the operation of transmission ser-
vices.  The energy markets would be day-ahead and hour-ahead
in nature, as were the California markets.
However, the key difference between California’s markets and
345 FERC SMD NOPR, supra  note 79.
346 And some regions of the country are not within an ISO.
347 The FERC SMD NOPR does not say how load-serving entities should meet
resource adequacy requirements.  However, bilateral contracts, effectively prohib-
ited in the California model, would be one way of meeting the requirement.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 75  8-NOV-04 14:36
In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron 281
the SMD NOPR is the nature of congestion management relief.
Under FERC’s NOPR, ISOs would adopt Location-Based Mar-
ginal Pricing (LBMP).  Under LBMP, the prices paid to genera-
tors and charged to load differ throughout the system as a
function of congestion.  If no congestion is present, the prices
throughout the system are the same.  However, if congestion is
present, the ISO will add or subtract to prices at the various
buses348 based upon the level of congestion.  For example, sup-
pose that there is congestion on a path between Generator X and
City A in the direction of City A.  The congestion created on the
path would change the price at both City A and Generator X.  To
relieve congestion, the LBMP at the City A bus would increase
relative to a reference bus price, which would cause the dispatch
of more expensive generation and discourage purchases at the
City.  The price at Generator X’s bus would decrease relative to
a reference bus price, discouraging generation.  Thus, if Genera-
tor X chose to sell power, it would pay for the congestion it cre-
ated.  The congestion system established by LBMP and FERC’s
SMD NOPR makes congestion costs transparent so that the mar-
ket can respond.
FERC claims that the SMD NOPR is effective in eliminating
many of the Enron strategies that proved successful in California.
For example, the FERC claims that the Fat Boy strategy would
be eliminated because most of a load-serving entity’s load would
be met through long-term contract—there would be no require-
ment that “load or generation submit balanced day-ahead sched-
ules.”349  Similarly, Enron’s congestion relief strategies and load
shift strategies would not work because the entity that causes
congestion is required to pay for it through the differential
price.350  Get Shorty, FERC asserts, similarly would not be prac-
ticable because financial trading of ancillary services would be
isolated from physical sales of ancillary services.351  Market miti-
gation measures, properly implemented, would ensure that pen-
alties are assessed for utilizing this strategy.  The sale of non-firm
energy as firm energy would not be possible because, under
SMD, “all transmission service would be under Network Access
service so there would be no difference in the ancillary service
348 A bus refers to the point at which power exits a generation facility, and may
also refer to the location of load.
349 FERC SMD NOPR, supra  note 79, at Appendix E, at 55,581.
350 Id . at 55,581-82.
351 Id . at 55,582.
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requirements . . . [and thus] no reason for this strategy.”352
One strategy that might not be cured through the market
mechanisms above is the Exports of California Power strategy.
However, the creation of geographically meaningful ISOs would
ensure that this strategy would fail.  One of the difficulties of Cal-
ifornia’s energy market was that the market suppliers extended
well beyond the borders of California and California’s regula-
tion.  The creation of a geographically meaningful ISO would
mean that power would typically not leave the ISO, absent signif-
icant price differentials among the ISOs.353  Moreover, the incen-
tive to export was in part due to capped wholesale power rates.
While the wholesale power rates may have protected the whole-
sale markets in California, they had the effect of increasing the
overall procurement costs of the ISO and causing scheduling
havoc.  Thus, the elimination of wholesale price caps, the estab-
lishment of properly sized ISOs, and the creation of appropriate
mitigation measures ensure that any regulatory evasion (assum-
ing rules do not permit export where market is capacity short)
will lead to a disincentive to export.
The difficulty with FERC’s SMD NOPR is that it is not clear
whether market participants will be able to manipulate the mar-
ket under its design.  If so, the market rules should allow for flex-
ibility such that ISOs can remedy market power arising due to
particular physical or geographical idiosyncracies within their
352 Id .
353 The DOJ has numerous times stressed the importance of properly sized ISOs.
See also  Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access Transmission Ser-
vice and Standard Electricity Market Design: Wholesale Power Market Platform
White Paper, Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Econ. & the Office of the Gen.
Counsel Fed. Trade Comm’n, Docket No. RM 01-12-000 (2003), available at  http://
www.ftc.gov/OS/2003/07/03062ferc.htm (last visited June 29, 2004).
One large assumption about the potential for regulation to cure market ills is that
regulation is backed by some enforcement.  Regulation without enforcement pro-
vides no deterrence to firms engaging in conduct in violation of the regulation.
Moreover, penalties for violating an agency regulation must exceed disgorgement of
profits obtained from such violations.  Otherwise, an incentive will always exist to
engage in the conduct.
This is, of course, one of the primary reasons that antitrust provides for treble
damages awards.  FERC currently lacks the ability to impose punitive or treble dam-
ages that might deter such conduct, although it does have the ability to revoke mar-
ket-based rates.  The California ISO made the argument that disgorgement does not
provide a disincentive to engage in conduct that would violate anti-gaming provi-
sions, but its argument was rejected by FERC. See  Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,020 (2004).
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markets.  Thus, it may be the case that the SMD ends up in the
final instance being rather heterogeneous in application.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this complicated article is simple: antitrust
fails to cure ills of markets where regulatory mechanisms sanc-
tion the ills, or create the ills where markets are nascent.  Thus,
regulation and antitrust must work in tandem to create efficient
markets, and the rhetoric that competition is inspired by “der-
egulation” is misleading at best and dangerous at worst, espe-
cially when paired with the notion that antitrust law will protect
these “deregulated markets.”
Clearly, there is a role for antitrust in energy markets.  Anti-
trust law can cure numerous ills, including naked price fixing,
monopolization, and mergers that tend to lessen competition.
Within the context of monopolization, a caveat is necessary: An-
titrust will not necessarily cure exercises of preexisting market
power.  Thus, economic and physical withholding may very well
be beyond the scope of antitrust.  Another caveat is necessary
with respect to mergers: Antitrust law is best able to review
mergers in the context of well-defined markets.  Thus, acquisi-
tions of power plants in markets yet to operate are likely to be
approved, because antitrust officials are unlikely to have the
tools to determine whether the acquisitions will injure those mar-
kets.  In sum, manipulations of the market not arising from con-
certed action may be unassailable under the antitrust laws, as
well as precompetition acquisitions of generation that create
market power.
Because antitrust is not a panacea for market functionality,
proper regulation is an essential complement to antitrust in over-
sight of energy markets.  Certain aspects of market power are
curable through regulation, even prior to the launching of mar-
ket-based pricing.  Similarly, precompetition acquisitions of
plants that may give rise to the incentive and ability to exercise
market power may be thwarted through regulatory bar.  Also,
actions that have no impact on price but that might give rise to
system instability may also be curable through regulation.
However, regulation itself is not a panacea, either.  Uncurable
through regulation are actions allowed by the market rules.  En-
ron’s activities, for example, in many instances were created by
perverse market incentives arising from flawed market design.
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Moreover, where market power mitigation rules are not properly
designed, market power may be exercised.
The position of this Article is that Enron did not cause the
California power crisis.  In many instances, Enron’s conduct did
not even violate state and federal regulation.  In most instances,
it is unlikely that Enron’s conduct violated the antitrust laws.
Enron most likely took advantage of market flaws that were pat-
ent to most market participants.  Instead of shooting the messen-
ger, the failed market mechanisms should have been cured.
Thus, “blame” for the power crisis should not fall upon Enron,
but rather upon the regulators who failed to correct the market
mechanisms that gave rise to incentives contrary to the healthy
functioning of the markets.
In most cases, regulation is better than antitrust at remedying
problems with market power that are inherent within an indus-
try.  Regulation can fix problems ex ante , whereas antitrust cures
problems only after they arise.  And, as stated above, regulation
has the potential to cure market abuses beyond those curable
through antitrust.  Thus, it is important for the market mecha-
nisms to be properly established at the onset of market competi-
tion, and that the market mechanisms be sufficiently flexible to
allow for changes in the rules where issues arise.  However, both
antitrust and regulation will fail to protect consumers if regula-
tions are not properly formatted.  Thus, the term “deregulated
markets” does not mean the abdication of market control.
Rather, the promotion of competition in “regulated” markets re-
quires active “re-regulation” combined with vigorous antitrust
enforcement.
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FIGURES
FIGURE 1: As demand increases, the market clearing price in-
creases as supply is generated by more costly generation.  How-
ever, if demand is significantly high, generation is not obtainable
at any price, resulting in brownouts and blackouts.
FIGURE 2: By withholding a tiny amount of marginal genera-
tion, GOTE can substantially increase its profits on its infra-mar-
ginal baseload unit, as the next most costly generator sets the
market clearing price.
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